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FAIR NOTICE: ASSURING VICTIMS OF
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES THAT THEIR
RIGHTS WILL BE RESPECTED
John W. Teeter, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
When an employer is found guilty of violating the National Labor
Relations Act (the "Act"),' the National Labor Relations Board (the "Board")
may require it "to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the
policies of this Act."2 This action frequently includes the reinstatement of
unlawfully discharged employees and the restitution of lost wages. 3 In
addition, the Board routinely requires the employer to post notices at the
workplace informing employees that it will not engage in certain unfair labor
practices and will take specified remedial actions.4
Whether simply posting such a notice will suffice, however, is quite
doubtful.5 Many workers have poor reading skills, others might not happen

*Professor, St. Mary's University School of Law. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Cheryl
Michiko Kuwada and Derek Kuwada Peter for their inspiration. My colleague Garry Stillman was
most helpful in sharing his ideas and research expertise. I also would like to thank my secretary
Aurelia Vincent and my research assistants Kathleen Takamine, Rosa Han, and Conry Davidson.
Finally, I am grateful to St. Mary's University for its financial support.
1. Codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988). Section 7 of the Act provides, in
relevant part, that "[e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection .
...
." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Section 8(a) of the Act, in turn, provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer:
(1)
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 7;
(2)
to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor
organization or contribute financial or other support to it...;
(3)
by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization ...
;
(4)
to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed
charges or given testimony under this Act;
(5)
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988). For an economist's analysis of § 8(a) violations, see John L. Blackman,
Jr., Relative Severity of Employer UnfairLabor Practices,22 LAB. L.J. 67 (1971).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988).
3. Id. For helpful overviews of the Board's remedial powers, see LEE MODJESKA, NLRB
PRACTICE 69-78 (1983); CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1633-94 (2d ed. 1983 &
Supp. 1993).
4. See, e.g., MORRIS, supra note 3, at 1657. An example of a recent notice may be found in
Monongahela Power Co., 314 N.L.R.B. No. 18 (June 24, 1994), a copy of which is located infra at
Appendix A.
5. For a cogent expression of such skepticism, see Peter B. Hoffman, Notice Posting: A Pilot
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to see the notice, and the mute posting of a piece of paper might do little to
reassure workers that a lawbreaking employer will now respect their rights.
Furthermore, numerous studies of the workplace confirm that oral
communication to employees is usually far more effective than written
notification. Finally, one would hope that if employers actually read the
notice aloud that could have more of an impact on their future conduct than
if a subordinate merely affixes it to a bulletin board.
For these reasons, in select cases the Board will order an employer to
read this notice to an assembly of employees in addition to posting it at the
workplace. This remedy, however, has been harshly criticized, especially by
various judges on the federal circuit courts of appeals. The most prominent
assailant of the remedy is Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who while serving
on the District of Columbia Circuit declared: "A forced, public 'confession
of sins,' even by an owner-president who has acted outrageously, is a
humiliation this court once termed 'incompatible with the democratic
principles of the dignity of man."'6 On such reasoning, appellate courts
frequently have modified this remedy or even refused to enforce it.
"Pygmies do not invite giants to combat,"7 but in this article I will
attempt to show that Justice Ginsburg and other critics of the remedy are
badly mistaken. The notice-reading remedy is not humiliating, it does not
entail a confession of sins, and it is not offensive to our democratic
principles. Furthermore, the remedy can be a small but essential step in
redressing the harm inflicted on workers by an employer's unfair labor
practices. For these reasons, I will argue that employers should always be
required to read notices aloud to their workers as a standard remedy for
violations of the Act.
II. THE GENESIS OF NOTICE POSTING AND THE
EMERGENCE OF THE READING REQUIREMENT
The Board's authority to require employers to post notices is wellestablished. Indeed, this power was affirmed in Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc.,8 the Board's first reported opinion. Having found that the
employers violated § 8(2)[now 8(a)(2)] by maintaining a company-dominated

Study, 18 LAB. L.J. 556 (1967). As Hoffman stated:
The informative, as well as the remedial aspects of notice posting, have met with a
considerable amount of criticism recently. There is more than a modicum of doubt
as to whether notices are read, understood, or sufficient to allay the apprehensions
and misgivings caused by the employer's unfair labor practices.
Id. at 557 (footnote omitted).
6. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1401 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241
(1984) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part) (quoting International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers
v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). Conair is discussed infra at notes 143-161 and
accompanying text.
7. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 525 (3d ed. 1991) (quoting 17 Cong. Rec. app.
at 444 (1886) (statement of Rep. Rowell)).
8. 1 N.L.R.B. 1 (1935).
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union,9 the Board ordered them, inter alia, to "[p]ost notices in conspicuous
places in all of the places of business wherein their employees . . . are
engaged, stating that said Association is so disestablished and that
respondents will refrain from any such recognition thereof... ,0 That order
was later affirmed by the Supreme Court."
The Board's requirement that employers post such notices soon became
a common feature of our labor laws. In NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 2
the Court curtly dismissed an employer's challenge, stating:
Only a word need be said of that part of the Board's order requiring the posting
of notices. We have often held that the posting of notices advising the
employees of the Board's order and announcing the readiness of the employer
to obey it is within the authority conferred on the Board by § 10(c) of the Act
13
"to take such affirmative action ...as will effectuate the policies" of the Act.

The Board realized, however, that the simple posting of such notices
would not suffice in every case. In isolated instances, the Board began
requiring employers to accompany the posting of notices with some verbal
assurances that the workers' rights would be respected. An early example of
this may be found in Taylor-Colquitt Co., 4 where African-American
employees at a Southern lumber concern were assaulted, threatened, and
discharged for their interest in unionization. As part of the Board's remedy,
the employer was directed to inform the workers "orally and in writing" that
management's personnel would not interfere with their rights under the Act. 5
The Board did not explicitly explain the need for such verbalization, but the
extreme and vicious nature of the employer's conduct surely may have been
a factor. The Fourth Circuit, in turn, enforced the Board's order without any
discussion of that remedy.16
The Fourth Circuit's affirmance was proper, for § 10(c) invests the Board

with significant freedom to fashion remedies appropriate to the facts of
specific cases. Indeed, courts should bear in mind that it is the Board, not the
judiciary, that has been given that power by Congress. As Justice Frankfurter
emphasized:

9. Section 8(a)(2), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988), has been criticized for unduly
restricting labor-management cooperation and is the subject of much recent scholarly debate. See, e.g.,
Mark Barenberg, Democracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From
Bureaucraticto Flexible Production,94 COLuM. L. REV. 753 (1994); Martin T. Moe, Participatory
Workplace Decisionmaking and the NLRA: Section 8(a)(2), Electromation,and the Specter of the
Company Union, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1127 (1993); Clyde W. Summers, Employee Voice andEmployer
Choice: A StructuredException to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129 (1993).
10. Pennsylvania Greyhound, I N.L.R.B. at 52.
11. NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938).
12. 312 U.S. 426, 438 (1941).
13. Id.
14. 47 N.L.R.B. 225, enforced, 140 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1943).
15. Id. at 257.
16. NLRB v. Taylor-Colquitt Co., 140 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1943).

4
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A statute expressive of such large public policy as that on which the
National Labor Relations Board is based must be broadly phrased and
necessarily carries with it the task of administrative application. There is
an area plainly covered by the language of the Act and an area no less
plainly without it. But in the nature of things Congress could not
catalogue all the devices and stratagems for circumventing the policies of
the Act. Nor could it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate
these policies in an infinite variety of specific situations. Congress met
these difficulties by leaving the adaptation of means to end to the empiric
process of administration. The exercise of the process was committed to
the Board, subject to limited judicial review, Because the relation of
remedy to policy is peculiarly a matter for administrative competence,
courts must not enter the allowable area of the Board's discretion and must
guard against the danger of sliding unconsciously from the narrow
confines of law into the more spacious domain of policy. 17

Viewed in this light, there should be no judicial interference with the
Board's ordering an employer to read the notice to employees. The Board's
power to order notice posting is well-settled, and the further requirement of
an oral reading rests soundly within the scope of the Board's discretion. The
Board, however, has been cautious in applying this remedy. Employers are
not routinely ordered to read notices, but must do so only where a mere
posting is obviously inadequate.' 8
17. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
18. For examples of the Board explicitly withholding this remedy, see Somerset Welding & Steel,
Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 32 (1991); Haddon House Food Prods., Inc., 269 N.L.R.B. 338 (1984); Cyntell Tool
Co., 196 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1972).
Cyntell illustrates the paucity of the Board's reasoning when it refuses to issue reading orders.
In Cyntell, the union requested a public reading where the employer was found to have threatened
employees, coercively interrogated them regarding their union sympathies, and engaged in other
transgressions against the Act. The Board refused, reasoning that the employer's actions were not
"outrageous," it was the employer's first offense, and judicial enforcement and contempt proceedings
were available if the employer continued committing violations. 196 N.LR.B. at 1033.
Such reasoning fails to bear scrutiny. Holding that the employer's actions were not "outrageous"
is debatable and is a vague standard that can only breed litigation. Although the employer in Cyntell
did not unlawfully discharge workers, many might consider threatening and interrogating employees
to be quite serious. This uncertainty over what is sufficiently "outrageous" could thus spawn litigation
as parties quarrel over the degree of outrage present in their particular circumstances. To preclude that
development, it would be more sensible to hold as a matter of law that any violation of the Act is
sufficiently important to trigger the reading remedy.
The Board's emphasis that this was the employer's first offense also seems misguided. How
many free bites at the apple should be allocated to a lawless employer? If we want to prevent second
and third violations of the Act -- and reassure workers that even a single violation is cause for concern
-- it would be worthwhile to impose the reading requirement on first-time offenders as well as the more
contumacious recidivists.
Finally, it is cold comfort that judicial enforcement and perhaps even contempt proceedings are
available in a given case. Such matters require the expense, delay, and uncertainty of haling the
employer into federal court. Rather than viewing that as a first level of recourse, the Board should
routinely impose reading orders in the expectation that this will deter future misconduct, educate both
management and workers to the Act's provisions, and reduce the Board's need to seek judicial support
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IlI. THE ILLITERACY JUSTIFICATION FOR READING
ORDERS
The Board is particularly likely to issue a reading order when it believes
that a large segment of the work force has a low level of literacy. This is
especially true when, in addition, the employer has committed serious unfair
labor practices. The Board's 1958 opinion in Jackson Tile Manufacturing
Co. 9 offers a paradigmatic justification for requiring an employer to read the
notice to employees. Here, the trial examiner explained that "[t]he theory
behind the Board's requirement that a respondent in an unfair labor practice
case must post a notice... is that such posting will restore the status quo by
freeing the employees from the coercive effects of the unfair labor
practices., 20 The employer, however, had undermined that purpose by telling
employees that such a notice was a "mere formality" and "unimportant"
while continuing to violate the law.2 The trial examiner, therefore,
recommended that the plant's manager be required to read the notice "to the
assembled employees, supervisory
staff, and the plant officials as an
22
policy.
company
of
expression
This recommendation was adopted by the Board, which reasoned:
[I]n order to dissipate the Respondent's coercive conduct toward its
employees, it is necessary to require the Respondent to read and distribute
copies of the notice ... to its employees. We do so not only because of
the numerous and serious nature of the unfair labor practices committed
by the Respondent but also because ...

the Respondent discouraged

employees, if it did not order them, to refrain from reading the notices
which it had posted [in an earlier case]. In addition, the23record indicates
that some of the Respondent's employees are illiterate.

for its rulings.
19. 122 N.L.R.B. 764 (1958), enforced, 272 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
20. Id. at 794.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Jackson Tile Mfg. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. at 767-68 (emphasis added). An employer's belittlement
of notice posting also played a role in the Board's issuance of a reading order in Great Ati. & Pac. Tea
Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 458, 458 n.2, 467-68. Among other statements, the employer's grocery assistant
superintendent told a group of employees that the notice was just a "little old letter" and asserted that
the unfair labor practice charges were not serious because even if the employer was convicted "the only

thing we will have to do is post a notice in the store." Id. at 467 (emphasis supplied by the trial
examiner). See also Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1795 (1966), enforcement denied in relevantpart sub
nor. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 904 (1968), discussed infra at notes 64-74 and accompanying text. Union
leaders have also disparaged the effectiveness of the Board's usual remedy, saying, for example, that
"it merely requires the employer to reinstate the worker to his job with back pay and to post a notice
saying the company won't be naughty again." SUBCOMMiT-rEE ON NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

87th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1961) REPORT
By THE NLRB [hereinafter HOUSE
(quoting William Pollock, President of the Textile Workers Union of America).

BOARD OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT

SUBCOMM.]

ACT
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The Fifth Circuit cursorily enforced the Board's order, 4 but relations
between the Board and reviewing courts were not to remain so peaceful. The
first open conflict concerning the remedy commenced in 1965 with the
Board's Laney & Duke decision. In Laney & Duke, the trial examiner
observed that many of the company's workers were "on a low level of
literacy and education."26 For that reason, he concluded that the employers
should be required to read the notice to employees upon request.2
The trial examiner's recommendation had obvious defects. From the
worker's perspective, it could be embarrassing to approach an employer,
explain his inability to read, and ask the employer to recite the notice's
contents. Moreover, employees understandably might feel some trepidation
about individually requesting this service from an employer that has been
found guilty of violating their rights. It would be sadly ironic to impose such
an onus on people the Act was designed to protect.
The trial examiner's approach was also unnecessarily burdensome for the
employers. One might wonder, for example, whether an employer should be
required to abandon other responsibilities and repeatedly recite the notice to
separate employees upon request. Perhaps sensing these problems, the Board
modified the trial examiner's recommended order so that the employers
"whether or not requested to do so," were required to "read the notice to each
28
of their employees, singly or collectively."
The Fifth Circuit's refusal to enforce this aspect of the Board's order is
a model of judicial fiat. The court simply invalidated the remedy on the
to
grounds that it was "unnecessarily embarrassing and humiliating
29
management rather than effectuating the policies of the Act.
The court's arrogant resort to that ipse dixit is offensive on numerous
levels. First, regardless of one's substantive convictions, it is disturbing and
unprincipled when judges simply impose their conclusions without any
reliance on precedent, principle, or reasoned argument. Such arbitrary
behavior is inherently unpersuasive and invites similarly arbitrary responses
from other judges. As Justice Scalia once warned, "he who lives by the ipse
dixit dies by the ipse dixit."'3
Second, the Fifth Circuit's bald reversal ignores the Board's primary
responsibility for crafting appropriate remedies for violations of the Act.
Judges, therefore, should be cautious about interfering with the Board's
remedial scheme. As Justice Douglas realized:

24. Jackson Tile Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 272 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1959) (per curiam).
25. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 248 (1965), enforcement denied in
relevant part,369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966).
26. Id. at 267.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 249 n.I (emphasis added).
29. NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 869 (5th Cir. 1966).
30. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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[I]t is important to remind that we do not sit as an administrative agency with
discretion to adjust the remedies accorded by the Act to what we think are the
needs of particular cases, with power to write or rewrite administrative orders in
light of what we think are the exigencies of specific situations, with the duty to
pass on the wisdom of administrative policies. Congress has invested the Board,
not us, with discretion
to choose and select the remedies necessary or appropriate
31
for the evil at hand.

The Laney & Duke opinion's third weakness is found in the court's
cryptic claim that the Board's remedy would be "unnecessarily embarrassing
and humiliating" rather than in fulfillment of the Act's policies.3 ' That
statement begs numerous questions. Why should an employer be
embarrassed about assuring the work force that she will obey the law? How
is it humiliating for an employer to state openly that he will respect his
employees' statutory rights? How could it be argued that this would not
effectuate the policies of the Act? The Fifth Circuit's failure to address these
questions strips its opinion of any coherence and leaves the court's
deliberative process a mystery.
The key to solving this mystery may be provided by Professor Atleson.
Atleson asserts that labor law is permeated by moral, political, and economic
assumptions and values that judges often do not articulate explicitly in their
published opinions.3 3 The presence of these values and assumptions "helps
explain many decisions which otherwise
seem odd, irrational, or at least
34
inconsistent with the received wisdom.
These values and assumptions, Atleson reasons, encompass the belief
that employers are the masters of the workplace and have the right to expect
the loyalty (or, more accurately, submission) of their hired hands.35 Perhaps
rooted in the prevalence of slavery and indentured servitude in America's

31. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., 312 U.S. 426, 441 (1941) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court has reiterated this philosophy on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper
Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) ("The Board's [remedial] power is a broad
discretionary one, subject to limited judicial review."); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S.
533, 540 (1943) (stating the Board's remedy "should stand unless it can be shown that the order is a
patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of
the Act"); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 600 (1941) ("The Board not the courts determines
under this statutory scheme how the effect of unfair labor practices may be expunged.").
32. Laney & Duke, 369 F.2d at 869.
33. JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 10 (1983). As
Professor Houseman has opined, "labor law is too often (or altogether) a victim of political and value
orientations that are particularly objectionable when they result in standing the purpose of the law on
its head." Gerald L. Houseman, American Labor Unions: Dependent Upon but Not FairlyProtected
by the Law, 36 LAB. L.J. 716, 722 (1985).

supra note 33.
35. Id. at 84 (discussing the "key assumption" that "employees owe certain obligations of
34. ATLESON,

deference and respect to their employer"). See also Karl E. Klare, CriticalTheory and Labor Relations
Law, in THE POLICS OF LAW 61, 81 (David Kairys rev. ed., 1990) ("Employees are thought to owe

a strong 'duty of loyalty' to the employer, although the employer owes no correlative duty to its
employees.").
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history, a deeply ingrained belief exists that workers owe considerable
deference to their "superiors" in the workplace.3 6 The passage of the Act and
the advent of collective bargaining, moreover, have done little to undermine
this conviction.37 In sum, "[tjhe management
of the workplace is assumed to
3
be hierarchical and authoritarian."
This assumption may help explain the Fifth Circuit's truculent refusal to
enforce the Board's remedy. If one views the relation of employer to
employee as that of master and servant, then one might well find it punitive
to compel the "master" to voice respect for the servant's legal rights. Such
a conceptualization, of course, cannot withstand scrutiny in light of the Act's
explicit protection of employee rights or, even more fundamentally, the ideal
of equality before the law. This theory, in turn, may explain why the Fifth
Circuit failed to support its emotional rhetoric. Although judges may sense
that an employer should not publicly have to address her employees as legal
equals, it could prove painful to acknowledge -- even to themselves -- that
such an antidemocratic vestige provided the nucleus for their legal
conclusions.39

36. Id. at 87-89. As Atleson suggests, "[t]he American view of the employment relationship may
intuitively have been affected by the substantial number of bound workers that had previously existed."
Id. at 88.
37. ATLESON, supra note 33, at 180 (concluding that collective bargaining "does not seem to have
altered basic legal assumptions about the workers' place in the employment relationship").
38. Id. at 45. Atleson's argument is echoed by many other scholars. See, e.g., Barenberg, supra
note 9, at 959 (discussing "employers' authoritarian control of workplace interaction and
communication"); Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker And His Industry
183 (1964) (asserting that "alienation remains a widespread phenomenon in the factory today");
Charles Conrad & Mary Ryan, Power,Praxis,and Self in OrganizationalCommunication Theory, in
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 235, 248 (Robert D. McPhee & Phillip K. Tompkins eds., 1985)
(discussing theory that "[o]rganizational power is grounded in the employer[s'] ability to threaten the
selves of their employees"); ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 139 (1941) (describing the
employer-employee relationship as a coldly instrumental arrangement in which "the owner of capital
employs another human being as he 'employs' a machine"); JAMES B. MURPHY, THE MORAL ECONOMY
OF LABOR: ARISTOTELIAN THEMES IN ECONOMIC THEORY 163 (1993) (observing that "[h]aving lost
control over the productive process, workers are subject to the authority and discipline of the
employer"); ROBERTO M. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN SOCIAL THEORY IN THE
SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 274 (1987) (asserting that "[wiorkers continue to suffer strongly
felt experiences of powerlessness and humiliation"). This conviction that the economically dependent
are vulnerable to domination and exploitation is by no means limited to current theorists or ideologues
of a particular political stripe. It was Alexander Hamilton, for example, who argued that "[i]n the
general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."
THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
39. This belief in the employer's supremacy has permeated the texture of labor doctrine. It is not
fortuitous that "America's labor laws provide far fewer protections against exploitation, injury, illness,
and unemployment than the laws of the dozen other leading Western industrial nations." WILLIAM E.
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT 1 (1991). Similarly, the
Board's current chairman asserts that "employment rights, rights which relate to the ability to provide
for oneself and one's family and to the basic human dignity of workers have lagged far behind the
evolution of rights afforded individuals in such areas as access to and protection of property." William
B. Gould, The Rights of Individual Workers, 17 CENTER MAG. 2, 2 (July-Aug. 1984). See also
Barenberg, supra note 9, at 759 (asserting that America has "the most unequal distribution of incomes
and job opportunities of any advanced industrial country") (footnote omitted); Houseman, supranote
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Finally, the Laney & Duke court ignored a fact critical to the Board's
reasoning: many of the employees were illiterate and could not possibly read
the notice. The Fifth Circuit plainly revealed its pro-employer bias by not
even addressing this concern. Although the court acknowledged "abundant
evidence" that the employer committed "flagrant" violations of the law, it
chose to pity the lawbreaking company rather than the illiterate employees.4"
The Fifth Circuit took a less dogmatic approach in NLRB v. Texas
Electric Cooperatives.4 Here, the Board ordered the employer to read the
notice because of the low degree of literacy among the work force.42 The
court enforced this remedy on the common sensical grounds that
"[o]bviously, if the employees are illiterate and thus not able to read the
posted notice it is not unreasonable to require the company to have the notice
read."43 The Fifth Circuit reached a similar result in NLRB v. Bush Hog,
Inc.44 Here, too, the Board required notice-reading because numerous
employees were illiterate45 and the Fifth Circuit enforced the Board's order.
The court distinguished Laney & Duke on the grounds that a far higher
percentage of employees were illiterate in Bush Hog.46 The court also
observed that an employer "may be required 'to give appropriate notice' to its
employees that it will respect their statutory rights" and that "[t]he Board is
not restricted to the method of posting customarily used, but may use
alternative means of requiring effective notice. ' 4' The court then concluded:
Certainly the Board may exercise a broad discretion in fashioning remedies to
require an employer to undo the effects of its own unlawful conduct and to
effectuate the policies of the Act, though the Board has no power simply to
punish the employer.
Where, as in this case, the Board has found numerous infringements of
protected rights and a low literacy level among the company employees we
cannot hold that the Board
abused its discretion in the notice reading requirement
48
of the present order.

33, at 726 ("No labor movement in the world has had to endure more repression, in all probability, than
America's has .... ) (footnote omitted).
40. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1966).
41. 398 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1968), enforcing in relevant part, 160 N.L.R.B. 440 (1966).
42. Texas Elec. Coop., 160 N.L.R.B. 440, 462 (1966).
43. 398 F.2d at 726.
44. 405 F.2d 755 (5th Cir. 1968), enforcing, 161 N.L.R.B. 1575 (1966).
45. Bush Hog, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 1575, 1597 (1966).
46. Bush Hog, 405 F.2d at 758.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 759. (citing Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940) (additional citation
omitted). See also Marine Welding & Repair Works, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B. 661, 681 (1969) (issuing
notice-reading order based on low literacy skills of some employees and the "atmosphere of fear and
futility" created by employer's violations), enforced in relevant part, 439 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam).
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The weakness in Bush Hog is that the Fifth Circuit's approach is vague
and could lead to both evidentiary quagmires and individual embarrassment.
The court distinguished Laney & Duke, where three out of fifty-four
employees had little or no reading skills, from Bush Hog, where
approximately forty-five out of about 190 workers could not read. 49 This
distinction invites questions over where to draw the line. If an illiteracy rate
of 5.5% is too low to justify a reading order but a rate of approximately
twenty-three percent is sufficient, then what about ten, fifteen, or twenty
percent? Such vague guidelines can lead only to uncertainty, conflict, and
litigation. 0
The Bush Hog distinction is also pernicious for it raises the specter of
acute embarrassment for employees with limited reading skills. After having
their rights violated by an employer, they might now be questioned on their
ability to read. Many of them could feel shamed before their co-workers and
fear that public knowledge of their illiteracy could damage their reputations
with the company and curtail their hopes for promotion. Rather than subject
employees to such distress, it makes more sense simply to have the employer
read the notice aloud.
Furthermore, illiteracy is not a rare phenomenon in the workplace. To
the contrary, the Board could safely assume that virtually all places of
employment have workers with low or even nonexistent reading skills. As
the Department of Education's National Adult Literacy Survey concludes, an
estimated ninety million American adults -- nearly one-half of the adult
population -- have difficulty performing at even the lowest literacy levels.5
Such deficiencies are not limited to menial laborers. As Professors Anderson
and Ricks report, "[1]iteracy deficiencies are not confined to the unskilled.

49. NLRB v. Bush Hog, Inc., 405 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1968).
50. Such problems, moreover, are already far too common in this field. As one commentator has
complained, "(e]ven experienced labor lawyers are having great difficulty advising clients on how to
obey the law." John S. Irving, Jr., The Crisis at the NLRB: A Callfor Reordering Priorities, 7
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 47, 47 (1981).
51. IRWIN S. KIRSCH ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, ADULT LITERACY

IN AMERICA 16-19 (1993). This survey's methodology, administration, and terminology have been
questioned. See, e.g., John M. Barry, A CriticalLook at Adult Literacy in America, 5 PUB. PERSP. 15
(1993). It is beyond dispute, however, that reading disabilities affect millions of American workers.
According to the Business Council for Effective Literacy, approximately 72 million adults are
functionally or completely illiterate. See Joanne Draus Klein, Waking Up to the American Nightmare:
One in Five Workers Can'tRead or Add Numbers Well Enough to Do the Job, 16 CORP. CLEVELAND
34 (1992). Similarly, the National Assessment of Education Progress found that 36 million adults
could not read at the eighth grade level and that 70 million fell short of the eleventh grade level. See
Jonathan Kozol, IlliteracyStatistics: A Numbers Game, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1986, at A3 1. Kozol's
own estimates are equally grim. He asserts:
Twenty-five million American adults cannot read the poison warnings on a can of
pesticide, a letter from their child's teacher, or the front page of a daily paper. An
additional 35 million read only at a level which is less than equal to the full survival needs
of our society.
JONATHAN KOZOL, ILLITERATE AMERICA 4 (1985).
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Many skilled, clerical, and technical employees also suffer from deficiencies
in language and mathematical skills."52
In light of this chronic national problem, the Board should routinely
order employers to read the notices to assemblies of their workers. In this
manner, the Board could assure that no employee's reading deficiencies
prevented her from learning of her rights.53 Moreover, oral notice would help
obviate the problem that even many literate workers might not happen to see
the notice posted at the workplace.54
IV. BEYOND ILLITERACY: ADDITIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR READING ORDERS
Let us make the fanciful assumption that every employee is highly
literate and religiously scours the workplace in search of possible Board
notices. Even in such a dream world, employers should still be required to
read the notices aloud to their workers. This necessity stems from the
heightened psychological impact that can be gained by an oral reading. For
an employer to stand before her assembled employees and orally read the
notice can convey a sense of sincerity and commitment that no mere posting
can achieve. One thinks, for example, of marriage vows. There is no
instrumental, legal reason for a couple to vow love and support for each other
in any kind of ceremony; simply filling out forms at city hall would achieve
the same alteration in the legal status of their relationship. For centuries,
however, we have understood that a marriage ceremony, complete with
verbalized vows of love and fidelity, may bring the couple closer together
and enhance the prospects for a successful union. Wedding ceremonies
obviously do not guarantee happy marriages, but millions of people annually
find them to be a promising beginning. The focus, therefore, should not be

52. Claire J. Anderson & Betty R. Ricks, Illiteracy--the Neglected Enemy in Public Service, 22
PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 137, 142 (1993). In fact, their national survey of local governmental
employers indicated that 37% "have experienced problems due to [the] inability of illiterate employees
to understand organizational rules or policies." Id. at 145. Perhaps even more disturbing is the failure
of American universities to assure that their graduates possess basic reading skills. See, e.g., William
H. Honan, Report Says Colleges are Failingto Educate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, § 1, at 46.
53. An example of the low literacy skills of many workers can be found in Red Top Cab &
Baggage Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 1433 (1964). In Red Top, taxi drivers sent a petition to the Governor of
Florida and other officials seeking "leagel"[sic] redress and vowing to appoint a "deligation"[sic] of
drivers to "disgus"[sic] their problems with the officials. Id. at 1457. This example highlights how
even workers sophisticated enough to unite for political and socioeconomic action may have difficulty
using and comprehending written English. Rather than ignore this problem, the Board and courts
should move to assure that it does not jeopardize the workers' ability to apprehend and vindicate their
legal fights.
54. Studies of American workplaces have demonstrated that not all employees consult company
bulletin boards where such notices are typically placed. See, e.g., HELEN BAKER ET AL.,
TRANSMITTING INFORMATION THROUGH MANAGEMENT AND UNION CHANNELS 41-43 (1949). As
Baker and her co-authors discovered, some employees may never read notices attached to bulletin
boards because they do not frequent those areas of the plant or are too busy to read such notices. Id.
See also Hoffman, supra note 5, at 557.
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on whether employees know the alphabet, but on how we can best assure
them that their rights will be respected in practice as well as on paper.5
This concept is reinforced by the knowledge that an employer's oral
communication to workers is usually far more effective than written
notification. This realization is hardly new; for many years it has been
common knowledge that "[pisychological tests indicate that leaflets or other
printed propaganda devices cannot match the persuasive power of oral
presentations."56 As numerous workplace-related studies have confirmed,
"[flace to face communication is most effective.""

55. Employers, of course, may view the notice-reading as being more akin to a shotgun wedding.
As Congress realized, however, "[t]here always will be a small minority [of employers] who are
amenable only to coercion." 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
ACT 26 (reprint ed. 1985) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
56. Note, Union Right of Reply to Employer On-the-Job Speeches: The NLRB Takes a New
Approach, 61 YALE L.J. 1066, 1074 (1952) (footnote omitted). Classic studies supporting this
conclusion include LEONARD W. DOOB, PUBLIC OPINION AND PROPAGANDA 529-32 (1948) (discussing
superiority of public meetings over radio broadcasts in influencing people); JOSEPH T. KLAPPER,
COLUMBIA UNIV., THE EFFECTS OF MASS MEDIA 11-9 to 11-10 (1949) ("The lecturer was found to be
the most effective in modifying opinions ... and the printed material least effective."); PAUL F.
LAZARSFELD ET AL., THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE: How THE VOTER MAKES Up HIS MIND IN A PRESIDENTIAL

CAMPAIGN 128-29 (2d. ed. 1948) (analyzing radio's superiority over newspaper in political contests);
RAYMOND W. PETERS, COMMUNICATION

WITHIN INDUSTRY:

PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF

MANAGEMENT - EMPLOYEE INTERCHANGE 78 (1950) (discussing advantages of oral communication);
WALTER H. WILKE, AN EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON OF THE SPEECH, THE RADIO, AND THE PRINTED
PAGE AS PROPAGANDA DEVICES 27 (1934) ("Several independent indices of the results of the

propaganda used showed the speaker technique to have the most striking positive effects ... and the
printed technique to have only a slight effect.").
57. Stuart M. Klein, CommunicationStrategiesfor Successful OrganizationalChange, 36 INDUS.
MGMT. 26, 27 (Jan.-Feb. 1994). See also Richard L. Daft & Robert H. Lengel, Organizational
Information Requirements, Media Richness and StructuralDesign, 32 MGMT. ScI. 554, 560 (1986)
("Face-to-face is the richest medium because it provides immediate feedback so that interpretation can
be checked."); Fredric M. Jablin, Superior-SubordinateCommunication: The State of the Art, 86
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1201, 1202 (1979) (noting that "face-to-face discussion is the dominant mode of
interaction" in the workplace); Jerry Tarver, Face-to-Face Communication, in INSIDE
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 205, 220 (Carol Reuss & Donn Silvis eds., 1985) ("Face-to-face
communication in all its forms continues to be important."); Cynthia Stohl & W. Charles Redding,
Messages andMessage Exchange Processes,in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION
451, 487 (Fredric M. Jablin et al. eds., 1987) ("ambiguous work environments are more effectively
clarified (not surprisingly) through face-to-face rather than written communication"). Indeed, as one
New Age economist has asserted, "the only really effective communication is from man to man, face
to face." ERNST F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL: ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE MATrERED 227-28
(1973). Despite these findings, there is still a profound need for further research. See, e.g., Robert A.
Snyder & James H. Morris, OrganizationalCommunicationand Performance, 69 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL.
461, 461 (1984) (noting that "studies of communication in work organizations are grossly
underrepresented in the empirical research literature"); Joanne Yates & Wanda J. Orlikowski, Genres
of OrganizationalCommunication: A StructurationalApproach to Studying Communication and
Media, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 299, 320 (1992) ("Empirical research is needed to investigate the
various social, economic, and technological factors that occasion the production, reproduction, or
modification of different genres in different sociohistorical contexts.").
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The Board has recognized the unique power of speech," and, for that
matter, so have employers. This is why employers commonly hold "captive
audience speeches" to rail against unions59 and typically prohibit union
organizers from campaigning at the workplace.6 ° As these employers
understand, no substitute for face-to-face communication exists. This, of
course, is why reading orders are important regardless of the workers' levels
of literacy.
The Fifth Circuit realized this in J.P.Stevens & Co. v. NLRB,6 where it
reasoned:
[I]t misreads the categorical imperative of § 10(c) ... to think that illiteracy or
low intelligence levels are the only justifications for this remedy. After all, the
traditional posting of the notice has a therapy beyond mere communication....
A part of the medicine is the traditional acknowledgement that the employer has,
62
but will not again, deny employees' rights.

58. See, e.g., H.W. Elson Bottling Co., 155 N.L.R.B. 714, 716 n.7 (1965) ("The unique
effectiveness of speeches addressed to employees assembled during working hours at the locus of their
employment has received congressional and judicial recognition and has been substantiated by
research studies."), enforced as amended, 379 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1967).
59. In captive audience speeches, the employer requires workers to assemble during working time
and listen to antiunion rhetoric. The Board explicitly affirmed the lawfulness of captive audience
speeches in Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948), but they have been widely criticized as
being inherently coercive. See, e.g., Craig Becker, Democracy in the Workplace: Union
RepresentationElections and FederalLabor Law, 77 MINN. L. REv. 495, 559 (1993) (asserting that

"such conduct involves an element of coercion easily distinguishable from expression").
One can disagree with Professor Becker's conclusion but nonetheless be disturbed at particular
instances of captive audience speeches. As one witness before a congressional subcommittee testified,
in his experience "[e]mployees were marched in large groups into a company dining room to hear top
executives viciously attack the unions, extol the company and hand out free ice cream and cigarettes
to the captives." HOUSE SUBCOMM., supra note 23, at 56. In light of such crude efforts at
indoctrination, it is not surprising that union spokesmen have denounced captive audience speeches
as "brain washing" sessions. Id. at 55.
60. Employers scored a major victory in Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992), where
the Court ruled that an employer may usually deny nonemployee union organizers access to the
workplace unless the union can demonstrate it has no other reasonable means of contacting the
workers. Critical reaction to Lechmere has been divided. One commentator acknowledges that the
decision will make "union organization ... more costly and more difficult," but praises the Court for
taking "a long step forward in reestablishing the sanctity of American property rights." Michael L.

Stevens, Comment, The Conflict Between Union Access and Private PropertyRights: Lechmere, Inc.
v. NLRB and the Question of Accommodation, 41 EMORY L.J. 1317, 1369-70 (1992) (footnote
omitted). Other scholars have been less sanguine. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor,Property, and

Sovereignty After Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REv. 305, 359 (1994) (asserting that "[c]ontinued recognition
of a broad right to exclude in the labor relations arena is founded on an outmoded conception of
property rights, one that curiously echoes the refrains of the Lochner era"); Robert A. Gorman, Union
Access to Private Property: A Critical Assessment of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.

1,20 (1991) (arguing that the decision "grievously trivializes the Section 7 right of employees to learn
about the union").
61. 417 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1969), enforcing 171 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1968), discussed infra at notes
109-14 and accompanying text.
62. Id. at 539-40.
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As the court appreciated, the therapeutic value of reading orders is not
limited to the instrumental task of communicating words. It also conveys a
sense of assurance that the employer will obey the law. Such assurance is
needed by the literate employee just as much as by her illiterate coworker.
Employers should therefore be required to read all Board orders to their
employees, regardless of the work force's level of literacy.

V. JUDICIAL REJECTION OF READING ORDERS
Although judges have voiced serious misgivings over the Board's
reading orders, it has been rare for the courts to reject them in their entirety.
There have, however, been important exceptions. Laney & Duke63 was the
first of these exceptions; a second prominent example is International
Union.64
Here, the employer engaged in "massive and deliberate violations of the
Act" which included numerous threats against employees who supported a
union.65 Moreover, the company's head of labor relations had ridiculed the
Board's remedial power, telling workers that in an earlier proceeding the
66
Board had "slapped our hands just like we were naughty little children.,
Faced with this background, the Board decided that more than a simple
posting of the notice was required. "[T]o assure notification to employees of
the Respondent's intent to remedy the unfair labor practices committed and
to refrain from committing other unfair labor practices in the future," the
Board ordered the employer to convene meetings of employees during
working time and read them the notice. 7
In an opinion authored by Judge Tamm, the District of Columbia Circuit
refused to enforce this aspect of the Board's order. Judge Tamm argued:
The public reading by the employer of the order would ... be humiliating and
degrading to the employer and undoubtedly would have a lingering effect on
future relations between the company and the Union. It could as well have an

63. NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 369 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1966), denying
enforcement in relevant part to 151 N.L.R.B. 248 (1965), discussed supra at notes 25-40 and

accompanying text.
64. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir.
1967), denying enforcement in relevant part to Scott's, Inc., 159 N.L.R.B. 1795 (1966), cert. denied,

390 U.S. 904 (1968).
65. 159 N.L.R.B. at 1796, 1807. For example, the company's president warned employees
wearing union insignia that "we are going to get rid of all you badge toters" and that "those boys
wearing the badges" would be fired. Id. at 1799. Such harassment of employees for wearing union
insignia is all too common. For a discussion of this problem, see John W. Teeter, Jr., Banning the
Buttons: Employer Interference with the Right to Wear Union Insignia in the Workplace, 80 Ky.L.J.

377 (1991-92).
66. Id. at 1797-98.
67. Id. at 1807.
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impact on the atmosphere, not only at the time of the reading, but in the future,
for peaceful, fruitful, and effective labor bargaining. It is conceivable that some
conduct on the part of an employer or a union might reach such extreme
dimensions as to justify the novel and drastic step of requiring the offending party
to stand up before the employees and read the Board's notice publicly, but we
cannot close our eyes to the reality that such a course would inevitably poison the
future relations between company and union and be a source of continuing
resentment. The ignominy of a forced public reading and a "confession of sins"
by any employer, any employee, or any union representative makes such
a
68
man.
of
dignity
the
of
principles
democratic
the
with
remedy incompatible

Judge Tamm's declaration represents the triumph of rhetoric over
reasoning. An employer that would feel degraded and resentful over having
to make a public acknowledgement of the workers' statutory rights should not
be the subject of judicial empathy. To the contrary, such an employer would
be the type of reprobate most in need of the Board's remedy. Furthermore,
Tamm's fear that the reading could "have an impact on the atmosphere" is
precisely the point -- we want to transform the environment into one where
employees feel confident that their rights will be respected. Tamm gave no
reason to support his claim that the reading would lead to continued strife
and bitterness in the workplace, and it is far more rational to expect that the
remedy would allow both management and labor to make a fresh start under
the aegis of the Act.
Tamm's depiction of the reading order as a "novel and drastic"
requirement is equally disingenuous. The Board had required oral assurances
since at least 1943,69 and during that quarter of a century there had been no
reports of the remedy leading to untoward results. Finally, Tamm
deliberately mischaracterized the reading as a "confession of sins" when, in
truth, it entails a simple affirmation that the employer will take remedial
action and comply with the law.7"
Tamm also rejected the idea that the remedy would be acceptable if the
employer were given the choice of either reading the notice himself or
permitting an agent of the Board to do so. For Tamm, this would put the
Board "in the position of not being completely neutral, although that is the

68. 383 F.2d at 233-34 (footnotes omitted).
69. See Taylor-Colquitt Co., 47 N.L.R.B. 225, enforced, 140 F.2d 92 (4th Cir. 1943), discussed
supra at notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
70. As one of the Board's former chairmen has explained:
The highly publicized charge that the Board require[s] a "public confession" ... is of
course without foundation in fact. Since Volume I of our reports, the posting of a notice
stating that the respondent will not do certain things forbidden by law has been
commonplace. For many years the Board and the courts have agreed that this notice
cannot be phrased in terms that require an employer or a union to admit violations of the
Act.
Frank W. McCulloch, New Remedies Under the National Labor Relations Act, in NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE OF LABOR RELATIONS, TwENTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 223,
236 (Thomas G.S. Christensen ed., 1969) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter ANNUAL CONFERENCE].
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position which the Board is legally duty bound to take.' 1 Here again, Tamm
is guilty of either woeful ignorance or deliberate deception. The mandate of
neutrality is plainly inapplicable when the Board is called upon to redress
unfair labor practices. At that point, the Board is under orders from Congress
"to take such affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of this
Act."7 2 As the Second Circuit has explained:
Of course the Board must be neutral in its approach to any proceedings before it,
but once it has been found that an employer has acted unlawfully, the question is
not how the situation can be neutrally remedied; it cannot, for a remedy is by
definition not neutral.... The reading of a Board order by a Board official surely
does nothing more to destroy the Board's neutrality than does the customary
heading on notices posted by employers pursuant to Board orders stating that the
employees are being notified "pursuant to a decision and order of the National
73
Labor Relations Board."

There is, thus, no principled justification for Judge Tamm's refusal to
enforce the Board's reading order. It would not have degraded the employer,
poisoned the atmosphere, or entailed self-incrimination. Furthermore, as
Judge J. Skelly Wright reasoned in his partial dissent, "[t]he fact is that this
employer has74acted unlawfully and adequate remedies are needed to restore
the balance.
VI. WEAKENING THE REMEDY: PERMITTING EMPLOYERS
TO HAVE BOARD REPRESENTATIVES READ THE NOTICES
Few courts have been as regressive as the Laney & Duke or
InternationalUnion tribunals. In more modest ways, however, judges have

71. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 230, 233 n.5 (D.C.
Cir. 1967).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988) (emphasis added). As Professor Lesnick explains, "were the

legislature to have embraced a concept of 'neutrality' so coldly indifferent to self-organizational rights,
the Wagner Act would never have been enacted in 1935 or would have been repealed outright in
1947." Howard Lesnick, The Labor Board and the Courts of Appeals: A Crisis of Confidence, in
ANNUAL CONFERENCE, supra note 70, at 35, 46.
73. Textile Workers of America v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1967), enforcing as
modified, J.P. Stevens & Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 217, cert.denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968), discussed infra at
notes 95-102 and accompanying text. As Iwill explain in part VI, infra, the problem with having a
Board agent read the notice is not that it imperils the Board's neutrality, but rather that it carries less
symbolic weight than a reading by the employer.
74. 383 F.2d at 234 (Wright, J., dissenting in part) (footnote omitted). For contemporary
commentary on the majority's decision, see David H. Huggler, Labor Law Remedies National Labor
Relations Board Order Requiring Employer to Read Unfair Labor PracticesNotice to Employees
Rejected as Inappropriateto Accomplish Disseminationof Information ConcerningEmployees' Rights,
13 VILL. L. REV. 422, 429 (1968) (concluding that "it is difficult to foresee any situation where the
forced reading would be appropriate"); Labor Law: Reading Provision in NLRB Order is
InappropriateExcept in Extreme Cases, 1968 Duke L.J. 173, 175 (finding "sound reasons for
enforcement of the Board's reading order").
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continued to dilute the potency of the Board's reading orders. This has been
accomplished by enforcing the Board's orders, but only with the condition
that employers would have the option of permitting a Board agent to read the
notices instead of doing so themselves. This modification strips the remedy
of much of its symbolic value, and it is regrettable that the Board frequently
has acquiesced in this matter.
This "compromise" approach was forged in a series of cases involving
the Stevens textile concern, a notorious repeat offender of the Act." In the
first case, JP.Stevens & Co. (Stevens 1),76 the employer committed "massive
and deliberate" unfair labor practices to crush its workers' organizational
efforts. These unlawful practices included discharging seventy-one
employees, making at least twenty-three illicit threats of reprisal and
promises of benefit, engaging in surveillance of union activities, and posting
threats on bulletin boards." For these reasons, the Board concluded that the
conventional posting of the notice could not negate the effect of the
employer's unfair labor practices. It therefore required the employer "to
convene during working 78
time meetings of employees.., and read to them
a copy of the ... notice."
Upon review, the Second Circuit was ambivalent in its response to the
Board's order.79 The court acknowledged that "remedial orders should not be
disapproved merely because they are imaginative" and recognized that the
Board was trying to "cope... with a major campaign of illegal anti-union
activity, spearheaded by retaliatory discharges. "' The court was also firm
in rejecting the employer's hyperbolic assertions that the Board was a
vindictive tyrant trampling upon the Fifth Amendment.8 ' With shameless

75. Indeed, the textile industry as a whole has hardly been known for its hospitality to unions. As
the president of the Textile Workers Union of America once explained:
Pro-union workers find themselves denied such basic rights as freedom of speech and
assembly.
They are browbeaten, brainwashed and terrorized by their employers.
Some are discharged in open violation of the law. And since there are few other job
opportunities in the small mill towns where most textile plants are located, a discharge amounts
almost to banishment from the community.
The employer, who dominates the mill town, mobilizes all of its forces against prounion
workers, including the press, the radio, the clergy, and even the police ....
HOUSE SuBcOMM., supra note 23, at 7 (opening statement of William Pollock).
76. 157 N.L.R.B. 869 (1966), enforced as modified, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
1005 (1967).
77. Id. at 878.
78. Id. at 878-79 (footnote omitted).
79. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
80. Id. at 303-04 (footnote omitted).
81. The Fifth Amendment provides in relevant part that no person "shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added.) Obviously
a prospective statement to comply with the law in a civil case does not transgress this constitutional
protection. Furthermore, even in criminal cases the government can compel testimony from an
unwilling witness by conferring immunity from use of the testimony in subsequent criminal
proceedings. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). This holds true even if the witness fears
his testimony may subject him to civil liability, physical harm, or economic retaliation. See, e.g.,
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disregard for law and logic, the employer attempted to rely on both the
Constitution and William Shakespeare to attack the Board. Citing Miranda
v. Arizona8 2 and Escobedo v. Illinois,83 the employer claimed that the reading
would be akin to a coerced confession. 4 "Upon what meat doth this our
Caesar feed?" the employer cried.85
The court swiftly disposed of the employer's constitutional gambit,
simply noting that "the notice "to be read does not in terms admit past
offenses. ' 86 The court then reasoned:
We have no desire to engage in humiliation of the Company; nor do we believe
the reading provision was put in the order for that purpose. It was designed
rather, as the Board said, "to undo the effect" of numerous and egregious unfair
labor practices by insuring that the full counteracting force of the remedial order
would be felt by the employees. Moreover, even posting a notice may be of some
embarrassment to the Company.87

To this extent, the Second Circuit's reasoning is meritorious. The
employer's constitutional argument was worthless, for the Board had not
required it to "confess" anything, far less the commission of a crime. Instead,
the notice was prospective -- stating that the employer "WILL NOT' violate
the Act and "WILL" take affirmative steps mandated by the Board. 8 To
misconstrue this as an interference with the Fifth Amendment makes a
mockery of a cherished constitutional right.
The court was also cognizant of the reading order's sound remedial
purpose -- to "undo" the atmosphere of fear and coercion created by the
employer's disregard for the Act.89 Moreover, the court recognized that the
employer's claim of "embarrassment" is without limits9" -- the thin-skinned
employer could always claim that he was "shamed" by even having to post
a notice (or, for that matter, being named as a respondent in Board
proceedings).
The Second Circuit did, however, undermine the potency of the Board's
remedy in two important ways. First, it held that the readings would be
ordered only at the twenty plants where unfair labor practices occurred rather
than at all of the employer's facilities throughout North and South Carolina. 9'
Second, the court required the Board "to afford the Company the alternative,

WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 426 (2d ed. 1992).

82.
83.
84.
85.

384 U.S. 436 (1966).
378 U.S. 478 (1964).
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304 (2d Cir.), cert.denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Id. (quoting Cassius in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR, act 1, sc.2).

86.
87.
88.
89.
(1967).
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 305.
JP.Stevens & Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 882-84 (1966) (emphasis added).
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304-05 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005
Id.
Id. at 305.
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at its option, of having the notice read by Board representatives, rather than
by its own officials."92
Neither of these limitations is prudent. The first modification seems
counterproductive in light of the employer's widespread illicit assault on the
workers' rights. Given that the employer had already committed unfair labor
practices at twenty of its facilities, requiring it to read the notice at all plants
within the two-state region seems a sensible prophylactic step rather than an
abuse of discretion.
It is the court's second level of interference, however, that is particularly
regrettable. The court claimed that its choice "eliminates the necessity of
participation by the Company, if it so desires, and still guarantees effective
communication of the Board's order to the Company's employees."93 This
focus is seriously myopic.
It is true that the notice would be technically "communicated" to the
workers regardless of whether it was read by the employer or a Board
representative. The psychological and symbolic value of the communication,
however, would be jeopardized if the employer did not read it. For a Board
agent to read the notice would permit the employer to distance himself from
the violations instead of delivering a personal pledge to take corrective
action. Furthermore, the employer's silence could trigger anxiety in the
hearts of the workers. Employees would naturally wonder, "If the boss will
really respect our rights, than why won't he say so himself?" Rather than
engender such concerns, the employer should have been required personally
to read the notice.94
In Stevens 11,9' the Board's reading order was again limited by the
Second Circuit. Here the Board found that the employer had refused to desist
from its massive, unlawful campaign to destroy the union movement. 96 The
Board attempted to treat this growing cancer with a second regimen of oral
readings. The Board explained:
This individual, face-to-face approach by the Respondent's supervisors
towards its employees we find to have a greater psychological impact upon the

92. Id. (footnote omitted).
93. Stevens I, 380 F,.2d at 305.
94. The court dropped the caveat that "[w]e do not hold that a reading provision without this
alternative would never be appropriate." Stevens I, 380 F.2d at 305 n.21. This naturally raises the
question of when such a scenario could arise. If unlawfully terminating 71 employees, threatening the
work force, and engaging in other unfair labor practices at 20 different locations would not justify the
Board's remedy, then one wonders what could ever satisfy the Second Circuit.
95. J.P. Stevens & Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 217, enforced as modified sub nom. Textile Workers of
America v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
96. Id. at 226. The Board also found that the employer's "long campaign of illegal intimidation
and unlawful discharge" was "largely successful." Id. at 227. As the Board explained, "[flew, if any,
union supporters are left, and those who might espouse the union cause, such as reinstated employees
who previously had been discharged for their union activity, would probably be afraid to promote the
Union for fear they would be discharged again." Id. For these reasons, the Board decided that
"[r]emedies other than the conventional ones are clearly called for here." Id. at 226.
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employees than similar remarks made by an employer in a letter to all employees
or in a speech to a large assembly of workers. We find, therefore, that the posting
of a notice, which is our usual remedy, is insufficient to dissipate the effects of
the Respondent's unfair labor practices. In this case it is essential that each
employee be made individually aware of his statutory rights. Accordingly, we
have ordered Respondent's supervisors, many of whom were directly implicated
in the unfair labor practices ...to read the attached "Notice to All Employees"
to the employees in their departments, thereby directly placing the imprimatur of
recognizable supervisory authority on the notice.97

The Second Circuit's response echoed its decision in Stevens 1.98 The
court again rebuffed the employer's histrionic rhetoric99 but softened the
Board's order. The court explained:
[I]n view of a number of considerations, including the element of humiliation in
having Company officials personally and publicly participate in reading the
notice, the order should be enforced only at those plants where the Board found
unfair labor practices, and should be modified to afford the Company the
alternative of having the notice read by Board representatives, rather than by its
own officials." °
As in Stevens I, the Second Circuit failed to realize the need for a
prophylactic region-wide remedy and the psychological importance of having
the notice read by company officials as opposed to government outsiders.
The Second Circuit's modification may be partially excused, however,
because it occurred with the Board's acquiescence. Instead of standing firm,
the Board conceded that "a reading by Board representatives will effectuate
the policies of the Act."' ' The Board's yielding on this point is unfortunate,
for a reading by a Board agent cannot logically carry the same impact as a
reading by management. Only the latter has the authority to hire, fire,
supervise, discipline, and take a host of other actions to affect the workers'
lives. It is the employer, not the Board agent, to whom the worker must look
for her daily bread, and any remedy that permits the employer to remain
silent loses much of its rehabilitative power.0 2

97. Id. at 227 (footnotes omitted). The Board again extended this requirement to all of the
employer's plants in North and South Carolina. Id. at 228.
98. J.P. Stevens &Co. v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
99. The employer repeated its allegation that the Board's remedy amounted to compelled selfincrimination. "During centuries past," the employer argued, "countless thousands suffered oppression
and tortures and death rather than confess they had committed wrong when they deeply and devoutly
believed that they had not." Id. at 904 n.8. The court coolly responded that "we regard the
requirement somewhat less emotionally than does the Company." Id.
100. Id. at 903-04 (footnote omitted).
101. Id. at 905.
102. It bears emphasis that the Board is not obligated to bow to the judgments of appellate courts.
Even if a circuit court refuses to enforce the Board's order in a given case, the Board can continue to
apply its original approach in subsequent cases. As the Board has stated:
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As Stevens III"3 reveals, however, the Board chose to continue along the
path of acquiescence. Confronted with the Stevens company's continued
defiance of the law, the Board ordered the "reading of the notice by either a
Board agent or company official."'"
The Fourth Circuit enforced this remedy,"0 5 but its opinion was not
unanimous. Judge Boreman angrily declared:
The forcing of such declarations, in the nature of confessions or recantations,
is not a matter to be lightly regarded. The feeling and the resolution of free men
against forced utterances can become extremely intense. Over many centuries
they have suffered oppressions rather than admit wrongdoing which they deeply
and devoutly believed they had not committed. In these newly devised directives
of the Labor Board there appears to be an ominous trend, whether so intended or
not, toward old oppressions, the eroding of fundamental rights and freedoms." 6

Once one dispels Judge Boreman's haughty rhetoric, it is apparent that
there is no substance to his claims. First, his insinuation that the employer
is being coerced into confession is simply wrong. The employer is not
required to admit any wrongdoing; she must simply enunciate a willingness
to comply with the Board's order. Indeed, the employer is little different
from a witness swearing to tell the truth or a government official taking her
vows of office. Furthermore, Judge Boreman's emphasis on freedom rings
rather hollow, as any concern for the workers' statutory freedoms is
conspicuously absent from his diatribe." 7

It has been the Board's consistent policy for itself to determine whether to acquiesce in the
contrary views of a circuit court of appeals or whether, with due deference to the court's
opinion, to adhere to its previous holding until the Supreme Court of the United States has
ruled otherwise.
Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768,773 (1957), enforcement denied, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C.
Cir. 1958), affd, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
There was thus no reason for the Board to acquiesce in the Second Circuit's Stevens I opinion,
and one wishes the Board had possessed the courage of its convictions in Stevens IL See, e.g., Samuel
Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J.
679, 707 (1989) (acknowledging "the legitimacy of an agency's desire to maintain a uniform
administration of its governing statute while it reasonably seeks the national validation of its preferred
position").
103. J.P. Stevens & Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967), enforced in relevantpart, 406 F.2d 1017 (4th
Cir. 1968).
104. Id. at 269 n.10.
105. Stevens III, 406 F.2d at 1022. On the same day that the Board decided Stevens III, it also
issued its decision in Stevens IV, J.P. Stevens & Co., 167 N.L.R.B. 258 (1967). Here too the employer
was given the option of having a Board official read the notice to employees. Id. at 258 n.2, 264.
Stevens IV was also enforced in relevant part by the court in J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d
1017 (4th Cir. 1968).
106. 406 F.2d at 1025 (Boreman, J., dissenting in part).
107. Judge Boreman and other critics appear to hint that the Board's reading orders could somehow
transgress the First Amendment's protection of"freedom of speech." That suggestion is never explicit,
however, for the good reason that it is utterly without merit. Cases such as Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding that "[t]he First Amendment protects the right of individuals ... to

22
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Finally, it bears emphasis that defendants adjudged to have engaged in
discriminatory behavior have frequently been required to voice their
intention to obey the law. In UnitedStates v. City ofParma,"8 for example,
a municipality found in violation of the Fair Housing Act 0 9 was ordered to
implement an advertising campaign promoting the city as an equal housing
opportunity community and to adopt a resolution welcoming all persons of
good will. In upholding these remedies, the Sixth Circuit explained:
It is common in [discriminatory] pattern or practice suits against private
defendants to require educational programs for employees and advertising
programs to advise the public of the nondiscriminatory policies which will be
followed ....
The requirement that Parma adopt a welcoming resolution is

refuse to foster ... an idea they find morally objectionable") (emphasis added) or West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that "no official ... can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein") (emphasis added) are clearly inapposite to the Board's
remedy. In a Board-mandated reading, the employer is not required to espouse an "idea," embrace an
"opinion," or express "faith" in any creed. Instead, the employer must simply state a willingness to
obey the law regardless of how he or she may feel about that law. As Professor Tribe has explained,
opinions such as Barnette are premised on the belief that the government may not force someone to
voice "an ideological view the individual finds unacceptable." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 804 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). That is a far cry from
requiring an employer found guilty of unfair labor practices to state a prospective willingness to
comply with the Board's order.
Furthermore, courts repeatedly have ruled that it does not violate the First Amendment to require
a convicted lawbreaker to publicize the fact of his conviction. See, e.g., Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d
652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (upholding requirement that probationer place advertisement in
newspaper containing his mug shot, name, and the words, "DUI-convicted"); Goldschmitt v. State, 490
So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (per curiam) (upholding requirement that convicted drunk driver
place bumper sticker on car reading "CONVICTED D.U.I.-RESTRICTED LICENSE"); People v.
Letterlough, No. 92-032 12, 1994 WL 284804 (N.Y. App. Div. June 27, 1994) (requiring convicted
drunk driver to affix sign on license plates stating: "CONVICTED DWI"). As the court explained in
Goldschmitt, such compelled messages are "no more ideological than a permit to park ina handicapped
parking space." 490 So. 2d at 125. In a related vein, the Lindsay court explained that "[e]ven the first
amendment right of free speech may be limited by an otherwise valid condition of probation." 606
So. 2d 657.
Such cases uphold requirements far more onerous than the Board's reading orders. In contrast
to the convicted drunk driver, who must advertise his conviction of a criminal offense to the public at
large, the employer need not don a scarlet letter. To the contrary, she must simply read the Board's
notice to her workers in relative privacy. Any supposedly compelled self-stigmatization is therefore
minuscule in comparison with what courts repeatedly have condoned in criminal cases. For a critique
of cases requiring those convicted of criminal offenses to display signs or issue public apologies, see
Toni M. Massaro, Shane, Culture, and American CriminalLaw, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991). The
cases Professor Massaro discusses, however, bear no resemblance to the Board's rather innocuous
remedy. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989) (compelling offender to
perform community service while wearing clothing identifying her as someone convicted of driving
while intoxicated); State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314 (Or. Ct. App.) (en banc), cert. denied, 777 P.2d 410
(Or. 1989) (requiring child molester to post signs on home and car doors stating "DANGEROUS SEX
OFFENDER--NO CHILDREN ALLOWED").

108. 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926 (1982).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
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relatively innocuous and fits in with the advertising campaign which we have
approved. "'

In light of this standard practice in cases involving housing
discrimination, there is no reason why a similar remedy should not be
accepted in cases where workers are discriminated against because of their
lawful union activities. In fact, the Board's notice-reading remedy is far less
expensive and burdensome than the remedies approved in Parma as it does
not necessitate the expenditure of money or the passage of a resolution.
Judge Boreman's wrath to the contrary, the remedy is a fair and efficient
means of attempting to redress the harm done to the workers' statutory rights.
The Board issued yet another reading order in Stevens V."'1 The Board
continued its acquiescence, however, by permitting the employer to have a
Board representative perform the reading." 2 This "softened" reading
requirement was enforced by the Fifth Circuit." 3 The court's opinion was
insightful, particularly in its evaluation of the competing interests between
employer and employees. With regard to the employer's supposed
humiliation, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that "embarrassment takes on a minor
value when outweighed by the necessity of effectuating the policies of the
National Labor Relations Act."" 4 The court also understood the need to
remove the employees' fear of coercion." 5 The court reasoned:

110. Parma,661 F.2d at 577. United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal.

1973), affd in relevantpart, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) is to similar effect. There the
defendants were ordered to conduct an educational program to inform their employees of the court's
decision and of their duties under the Fair Housing Act, as well as "inform[ing] the public generally
and their customers and clients specifically" of their nondiscriminatory policy. Youritan, 370 F. Supp.
at 652.
111. J.P. Stevens & Co., 171 N.L.R.B. 1202 (1968), enforced, 417 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1969).
112. Id. at 1202.
113. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 417 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1969).
114. Id.at 539.
115. Id. Supporting its premise that employees may fear retaliation from employers, the court
relied on the classic article, Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation
Elections Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38 (1964) (cited in Stevens V,
417 F.2d at 540 n.16). As Bok concluded:
In regulating organizational activity, a realistic sense of priorities should lead us to
recognize that an elemental fear of reprisal still poses the major threat to the free and fair
elections contemplated by the act. Under these circumstances, lesser problems should not
be allowed to obscure the pressing need for more effective restraints against the clear
threats and discriminatory discharges that do so much to awaken the fears of many
employees.
Bok, supra, at 140-41. This problem, moreover, has worsened rather than diminished over the past
several decades. As Professor Weiler warns, there has been a "skyrocketing use of coercive and illegal
tactics" by employers, and "[tihe current system of unfair labor practice remedies has proved
powerless to contain such intimidation or to undo its effects." Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep:
Securing Workers'Rights to Self-Organization under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1769-70
(1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises to Keep]. See also Barenberg, supra note 9, at 932 (discussing
"the legal regime's woeful failure to protect workers' freedom of association"); Charles B. Craver, The
National Labor RelationsAct Must be Revised to PreserveIndustrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV.
397, 436 (asserting that the inability of current remedies to protect workers and unions "encourages
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For repeated violations persisted in despite intervening declarations of illegality,
the Board is warranted in impliedly concluding that such conduct has created a
chill atmosphere of fear and, further, in recognizing that the reading requirement
is an effective but moderate way to let in a warming wind of information and,
more important, reassurance. 16

It is difficult to find fault in the Fifth Circuit's opinion -- it showed
proper respect for the Board's remedial discretion, recognized the rather
picayune nature of an employer's "embarrassment," and appreciated the
therapeutic value of reading notices for the workers. It is unfortunate,
however, that the Board had not ordered the employer itself to deliver the
recitation. 17
Following the Stevens cases, the Board has usually accompanied its
reading orders with the proviso that the employer could opt to have a Board
agent read the notice."' The Board's recent decision in Three Sisters
Sportswear Co., 9 for example, demonstrates the Board's continued
hesitancy to require a personal reading by employers. In Three Sisters, the
administrative law judge believed that the company's chief executive officer
should personally read the notice because he "was responsible for and
directly implicated in most of the violations found."" 0 The Board, however,

unscrupulous companies to ignore their legal obligations"); Howard J. Parker & Harold L. Gilmore,
The UnfairLaborPracticeCaseload: An Analysis ofSelected Remedies, 34 LAB. L.J. 172, 174 (1983)
(explaining how the weakness of the Board's remedial powers "creates a situation in which violation
becomes a very attractive alternative to an employer").
This rising tide of unfair labor practices has taken its toll on American workers' sense of security.
According to Professor Weiler, a Lou Harris poll demonstrates that "fully 43% [of nonunionized
workers] believe that their employer would fire, demote, or otherwise make life miserable for union
supporters in a representation campaign." Paul C. Weiler, Milestone or Tombstone: The WagnerAct
at Fifty, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 11 n.18 (1986). Furthermore, Professor Barenberg reports that
"about eighty percent of the public believes employers are likely to fire workers for engaging in union
activit[ies]." Barenberg, supra note 9, at 931-32 (citing FingerhutiPowers, National Labor Poll
(1991)).
116. Stevens V,417 F.2d at 539-40 (footnote omitted).
117. The Board continued to grant the employer this option in J.P. Stevens & Co., 179 N.L.R.B.
254, 285 (1969), enforced, 441 F.2d 514, 527 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830 (1971). The Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Stevens VI is noteworthy due to Judge Goldberg's pessimism regarding the efficacy
of Board remedies. Judge Goldberg opined that "to the Company, the words of judicial and
administrative admonition are as but 'sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal' and concluded his opinion
by "praying that there will be no Stevens VII." J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 514, 528. That
prayer, unfortunately, went unanswered and the Stevens company continued to be a litigant before the
Board and courts. See, e.g., NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam)
(finding the employer in civil contempt for violating the court's orders in Stevens land 11),
cert. denied,
410 U.S. 926 (1973).
118. The appellate courts, in turn, have shown a general willingness to enforce this modified
version of the reading order. See, e.g., Monfort of Colo., Inc., 298 N.L.R.B. 73 (1990), enljbrced in
relevant part,965 F.2d 1538 (10th Cir. 1992); Marine Welding & Repair Works, Inc., 174 N.L.R.B.
661 (1969), enforced in relevant part,439 F.2d 395 (8th Cir. 1971) (per curiam).
119. 312 N.L.R.B. 853 (1993).
120. Id. at 880. In addition to being unlawful, some of the behavior was bizarre and carried strong
overtones of violence. In one instance, the company's chief executive officer pushed a female
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provided that the official "may elect to have the notice read by a Board agent
rather than to read it himself."''
It appears, therefore, that the Board will usually give employers the
option of having a Board representative read the notice. This is misguided,
for it is the employer who committed the violations, is a daily presence at the
company, and can prove a continuing threat to the workers. For these
reasons, the Board should not succumb to appellate pressures to modify its
reading orders. 2 '
VII. REQUIRING INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYERS TO READ THE
NOTICE
In rare cases, the Board has insisted that the notice-reading be performed
by a particular official in the employer's hierarchy. The Board typically
reserves this remedy for cases where the named official's involvement in the
unfair labor practices has been both personal and extensive. Even under such
limited circumstances, however, personalized reading orders have led to
significant conflict between the Board and circuit courts.
Loray Corp.23
' exemplifies when the Board will require a named official
to read the order. As the Board explained, this order was necessary due to
the egregious nature of the violations and the official's extensive personal
involvement.'24 The Board stated:
We find that our usual remedies, the posting of a notice and the order for
reinstatement and backpay for the discriminatees, are insufficient to dissipate the
effects of the Respondent's extensive and flagrant unfair labor practices. In this
case it is essential in view of the flagrancy of the Respondent's opposition to
unionization that each employee be made individually aware of his statutory
rights and that his exercise of rights will be respected by his Employer. In our

Hispanic employee and in a separate incident physically blocked another female Hispanic employee
from leaving the office after his brother had screamed obscenities at her. Id. at 868, 870.
A disturbing similarity between Three Sisters and Domsey Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777
(1993), enforced, 16 F.3d 517 (2d Cir. 1994), discussed infra at notes 175-77 and accompanying text,
is that both cases involve obscene and violent actions by employers against women of color. This
tragic phenomenon, which traditionally has received far too little attention, is finally being discussed
in a serious and insightful manner. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizingthe Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of AntidiscriminationDoctrine, Feminist Theori' and
Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS
ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Toni Morrison

ed., 1992).
121. 312 N.L.R.B. at 853.
122. For a contrary perspective, see Hoffman, supra note 5, at 559. Hoffman merits praise for
being an early advocate of issuing reading orders, but he erred in believing that it would suffice to have
a Board agent perform the recitation. Id. See also Philip Ross, Analysis of Adilinistrative Process
Under Taft-Hartley, 63 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 132, 153 (Oct. 17, 1966) (calling for Board
representatives to read notices).
123. 184 N.L.R.B. 557 (1970).
124. Id. at 558.
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view the mere posting of notices would not serve this purpose and we find
additional measures are necessary. Accordingly, in addition to posting copies
thereof at appropriate places, we have ordered Respondent's owner, president, and
chief administrator [Schwartz] who was directly implicated and the major mover
in the numerous unfair labor practices to personally sign the notices. We have
also ordered Schwartz to personally read the attached "Notice to All Employees"
at assembled meetings at which all employees will be reached, thereby directly
placing on the notice the imprimatur of the person most responsible for the illegal
acts in question. We order this not out of any desire to punish or embarrass
Schwartz. However, in the light of the repeated adamant proclamations by
Schwartz that it was futile for his employees to organize, we are of the opinion
that unless the employees hear from Schwartz himself that he will conform his
conduct to the requirements of the Act the coercive and restraining effect of
Schwartz' conduct and utterances will not be dissipated.125

Loray is an excellent opinion, for it recognizes that the best way to
remove the cloud of fear created by the employer's misconduct is for the
employer personally to announce that he will respect the workers' rights. The
argument should be extended, however, so that a company official would
always be required to perform the reading. The choice of which official to
name should be entrusted to the Board's discretion, as it will have more
familiarity with the facts at hand than a reviewing court could hope to
possess. In some instances, symbolic resonance could be maximized by
having the company's chief executive officer perform the reading.126 This
would convey to the workers that the company took their rights seriously and
that even top management would safeguard them from retaliation. In other
instances, the remedy could have greater meaning if the speaker was a lowerlevel supervisor with whom the workers had a more familiar daily
relationship. 2 7 Again, however, the Board would be in the best position to

125. Id. (footnotes omitted).
126. As Professor Klein argues, "the credibility of a message is directly related to the status of the
source of that message." Klein, supra note 57, at 27. For that reason, the Board could decide that

requiring a company's chief executive officer to read the notice would maximize its credibility.
127. As Klein explains:
The supervisor is a key communicator - The hierarchy of authority is linked through
supervision at each level. People expect to hear important officially sanctioned

information from their immediate supervisor or boss. Supervisors are expected to be wellinformed and to be accurate transmitters of information. Moving down through the ranks
to the non-management level, supervision takes on an even more important characteristic.
The most important actor and the primary company representative is their immediate
supervisor. Consequently, the role of supervision as the last of the hierarchical
communications link to the nonsupervisory employees is an essential one.
Klein, supra note 57, at 28. The workers' perceptions of their supervisors can, of course, depend upon
a wide range of factors. See, e.g., Ronald J. Burke & Douglas S. Wilcox, Effects of Different Patterns
and Degreesof Openness in Superior-SubordinateCommunication on SubordinateJob Satisfaction,
12 ACAD. MGMT. J. 319, 326 (1969) ("In general, the greater the openness of either superior or
subordinate (or both), the greater the degree of subordinate satisfaction .... ."); Paul M. Muchinsky,
OrganizationalCommunication: Relationships to OrganizationalClimate and Job Satisfaction, 20
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assess this on a case-by-case basis. Loray represents an important step in the
right direction by compelling a corporate wrongdoer to take individual
responsibility for his violations of the Act.
The Board also issued an individualized reading order in United Dairy
Farmers Cooperative Ass'n.'28 Here the Board found that the employer's
unfair labor practices were so "outrageous" and "pervasive" that
"conventional remedies will not suffice to dissipate them and are inadequate
to give Respondent's employees sufficiently explicit reassurances and
understanding of their rights under the Act." 129 The Board therefore ordered
the company's president to read the notice to employees and to give the
Board a reasonable opportunity to attend and witness that recitation. 3 '
The Board's approach was well taken, for the president had personally
threatened and interrogated employees. The Board reasoned, "[a]s it is clear
that Respondent's unlawful campaign emanated from the top; so too must
reassurances that this company campaign will end come from the top."' 3 '
The Board realized that having one of its agents read the notice could not
have the same impact upon employees as hearing the words from the actual
instigator of the violations. The Board was also prudent in stipulating that
an agent of the Board must be given a reasonable opportunity to attend the
reading. This provision imposes only minimal expense on the Board and
helps assure that the employer actually
convenes the workers and reads the
32
notice in a meaningful manner.
The Board also issued an individualized reading order in Sambo's
Restaurant,Inc.'33 Here the Board ordered the company's district manager
to read the notice as part of an effort "to dissipate as much as possible the
lingering atmosphere of fear created by Respondent's unlawful conduct and
to insure that if the question of union representation is placed before
employees in the future they will be able to voice a free choice."' 3 4 This
order was enforced by the Ninth Circuit, which held that the company was

ACAD. MGMT. J. 592, 600 (1977) ("[I]t seems highly plausible that the [employee's] perceived trust
in the supervisor and perceived influence of the supervisor would be highly related to the way
[employees] perceive[] management. . . ."); PAMELA SHOCKLEY-ZALABAK, FUNDAMENTALS OF
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 148 (2d ed. 1991) ("[T]he credibility of the supervisor is more
important than organizational status in determining who is approached for task, political, and social
information.").
128. 242 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1979), enforced in relevantpart,633 F.2d 1054 (3d Cir. 1980).
129. Id. at 1029. The employer's actions included wrongfully discharging union supporters and
threatening employees. United Dairy Farmers Coop. Ass'n v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 1054, 1056 (3d Cir.
1980).
130. 242 N.L.R.B. at 1029.
131. Id. at 1029 n.14.
132. Upon judicial review, the Third Circuit enforced the reading requirement but remanded the
case for the Board to consider whether it should also issue a bargaining order. United DairyFarmers
Coop, 633 F.2d at 1070.
133. 247 N.L.R.B. 777 (1980), enforced, 641 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1981).
134. Id. at 777-78.
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barred from contesting the remedy on appeal because it had failed to file a
motion for reconsideration before the Board. 3 '
In Teamsters,1 36 however, the District of Columbia Circuit nullified the
Board's individualized reading order. Here the Board concluded that the
employer's unlawful discharges and other violations had created a "lingering
atmosphere of fear" and were "likely to have a continuing coercive effect" on
the work force. 137 The Board therefore ordered the company's owner and
manager to read the notice aloud to assure "that each employee will be made
individually aware of his statutory rights and will personally be assured by
Respondent's3 highest ranking representative that those rights will be
respected." 1
The D.C. Circuit refused to enforce this order in its original form.
Writing for the court, Judge Mikva emphasized that the owner personally
committed only one of the company's numerous unfair labor practices, and
39
there was thus no "unusual need" for the owner to read the order himself. 1
Judge Mikva then concluded:
It is quite likely that a personal assurance from the chief executive officer of
a company will have a marginally greater impact than one coming from some
other official of lesser rank. But the negative aspects of the order overwhelm the
marginal benefit. Such specificity is uniquely oppressive on the individual
singled out, and the lack of particularized need may create the misimpression that
the Board is seeking to punish an uncooperative respondent. When the remedial
value is as slight as it is in this case, we think that the hardship outweighs the
benefit.... Giving due regard to personal dignity and the limitations on the
Board's discretion, we think such a specific reading order is unjustified. We will
enforce this provision of the Board order only if it is modified to require the
140
Employer to "have a responsible officer of Respondent" read the Board notice.

Judge Mikva's analysis is long on sophistry, short on substance, creates
needless ambiguities, and unjustly shifts the burden from the company's head
officer to some innocent underling. First, he never explains why it is
oppressive for a company's chief executive officer to read the notice. That
officer is, after all, the proverbial captain of the ship and should be expected
to take responsibility for the company's unfair labor practices. It is therefore
irrelevant whether the company's owner personally committed "only" one
unfair labor practice or many. Moreover, Judge Mikva's emphasis on the
number of unfair labor practices leads to uncertainty: what number or

135. 641 F.2d at 796. See also United Supermarkets, Inc., 261 N.L.R.B. 1291 (1982) (ordering

owner of company to read notice to assembled employees).
136. Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1981), enforcing as modified Haddon
House Food Prods., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1979).
137. 242 N.L.R.B. at 1058.
138. Id. at 1058-59.

139. 640 F.2d at 403.
140. Id. at 403-04 (footnote omitted).
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percentage of violations committed would justify an individualized reading
order?
Judge Mikva's opinion adds further ambiguity by requiring that "a
responsible officer" of the company perform the reading. Who might that
description encompass? One can envision future conflicts over whether a
treasurer, personnel director, or foreman would satisfy the court. More
importantly, it is the Board that has the best opportunity to appraise the
company's hierarchy and select the most appropriate official to reassure
employees of their statutory protection. Judge Mikva effectively strips the
Board of that ability and vests the discretion in the hands of the employer,
who has been found guilty of violating the Act and could deliberately select
a less than credible official. 4 '
Finally, Judge Mikva's opinion is meritless insofar as it purports to be
based on "personal dignity." If the court really believed that the reading is
so humiliating, then it could not justify permitting the owner to delegate it to
a subordinate who played no role in the violations. There is nothing
degrading about a president affirming that her company will obey the law,
but there would be a degree of oppression if she could compel an innocent
subordinate to deliver the recitation.
In sum, Teamsters represents the pitfalls of judicial interference. The
opinion ignores the Board's remedial discretion, undermines the
psychological impact of the remedy, and insulates a company's4 2top
management at the expense of those lower in the corporate hierarchy.
The District of Columbia Circuit took a slightly more reasonable
approach in Conair Corp.4 3 Based on the company's "massive and
unrelenting coercive conduct," the Board ordered the company's owner and
president to read the notice to assembled employees.' 44 This remedy was
141. Perhaps what Judge Mikva meant by "a responsible officer" was an individual responsible for
the occurrence of the unfair labor practices. That definition, however, was not suggested by the court,
and there still would be no justification for having the employer rather than the Board select the reader.
142. Notwithstanding this interference, Judge Mikva supported the legitimacy of reading orders in
general. As he realized:
This is not a mere "additional" promulgation of the notice's contents, but rather a
deliberate attempt to alleviate the workers' fears about the Employer's intentions. The
reading can do little to disrupt the already strained relationship between the Employer and
the Union, and it may be of substantial benefit to the employees. Whether or not this hope
is realized, we cannot say that the Board was wrong to make an effort in that direction.
640 F.2d at 402-03.
143. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), enforcing in relevant part, 261
N.L.R.B. 1189 (1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1241 (1984).
144. 261 N.L.R.B. at 1193-95, 1285. As the Board explained:
There can be no doubt of the extreme gravity of Respondent's violations of the Act.
In particular, the numerous discriminatory discharges are serious unfair labor practices
which go "to the very heart of the Act" and have a lasting coercive impact on employees.
...This mass discharge imparted in dramatic fashion the unmistakable message that loss
of employment was the price to be exacted for the exercise of Section 7 rights. In
subsequent months, Respondent reinforced and embellished this coercive message by
repeatedly threatening discharge, by discriminatorily refusing reinstatement to some
discharged strikers, by discriminatorily delaying reinstatement of other strikers, by
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enforced by a divided panel of the District of Columbia Circuit. 45 In a
portion of the opinion joined by then-Judge Scalia, Judge Wald held that the
extensive personal involvement of the company's president justified the
Board's order. Judge Wald reasoned:
The president of a company may indeed ordinarily be entitled to protest as
oppressive a requirement that he read to the employees, even on a single
occasion, a statement of their rights and his company's obligations under the Act.
The dignity interests implicated by such a requirement must always be carefully
weighed and may be decisive when unfair labor practices, however egregious, are
carried out entirely or primarily by subordinate management personnel. But it is
the pervasive personal involvement of President Rizzuto in the unfair labor
practices in this case that creates the need and justification for his personal
involvement in their remedy. In order to dispel the atmosphere of intimidation
created in large part by the president's own statements and actions, it is justifiable
to require at least one formal declaration by him personally that the employees'
statutory rights will be respected in the future. The Board's order can thus
reasonably be said to effectuate the purposes of the Act, and is not punitive, as
argued by the Employer. While we emphasize that a remedy such as that ordered
here should be reserved for extraordinary circumstances giving rise to a particular
remedial need, it is important to recall that the notice to be read by the president
is nothing more nor less than an official statement of the statutory rights and
obligations found to have been violated by the Employer. Under the special
circumstances of this case, we will enforce this aspect of the Board's order. 46

Judge Wald's enforcement of the Board's reading order was far too
grudging, for it failed to recognize the value of having a specific company
official read the notice in every case. Nonetheless, her opinion was met with
a stinging partial dissent by then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who argued
that "it is foreign to our system to force named individuals to speak

discriminatorily discharging reinstated strikers, and by repeatedly threatening plant

closure in retaliation against the Union's campaign. Moreover, these unfair labor practices
were only the most serious among the many committed by Respondent.
Id. at 1192-93 (footnotes omitted).
145. The court refused, however, to enforce the Board's order that the employer bargain with the
union, reasoning that bargaining orders are improper when the union has never demonstrated that it
is supported by a majority of the workers in the proposed bargaining unit. 721 F.2d at 1384. This
issue in the case has fueled considerable debate, particularly among law review editors. See, e.g.,
Diana Dietrich, Note, Labor Law---Remedial Non-Majority Bargaining Orders-ConairCorp. v.
NLRB, 33 KAN. L. REV. 345 (1985); Maureen N. Egan, Recent Cases, ConairCorp. v. NLRB: Limits
on the Power of the NLRB to Remedy Employer Unfair Labor Practices,33 DEPAUL L. REV. 813
(1984); Richard B. Lapp, Note, Remedial Gap at the NLRB Following the Demise of the Nonmajority
BargainingOrder: Gourmet Foods, Inc. and Warehouse Employees, Local 503, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
1193; David S. Shillman, Note, Nonmajority Bargaining Orders: The Only Effective Remedy for
Pervasive Employer Unfair Labor PracticesDuring Union OrganizingCampaigns, 20 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 617 (1987). For the perspective of a Board member who dissented on this issue, see Robert P.
Hunter, Conair: Minority BargainingOrders Usher in 1984 at NLRB, 33 LAB. L.J. 571 (1982).
146. 721 F.2d at 1386-87 (footnotes omitted).
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prescribed words to attain rehabilitation or to enlighten an assembled
audience."147 Instead, Judge Ginsburg believed that the company's president
should be allowed "to choose between reading the notice himself or
designating a responsible officer to read it on his behalf."'' 41 She then
concluded:
A forced, public "confession of sins," even by an owner-president who has
acted outrageously, is a humiliation this court once termed "incompatible with the
democratic principles of the dignity of man." It has a punitive, vindictive quality
and is the kind of personal performance command equity decrees have avoided.
Moreover, as Board Chairman Van de Water noted, a reading of the notice by
the president may be less effective than a reading by another responsible officer.
The former, humiliated and degraded by the personal specific performance order,
may demonstrate "by inflections and facial expressions, his disagreement with the
terms of the notice." The latter, assigned the task but lacking the same personal
involvement, may perform it with less distaste, more detachment, and thus with
greater credibility. I would not single out the president here, or any other named
individual, hand him lines, and make him sing.'49

It is disappointing that a judge of Justice Ginsburg's unquestionable
intellect and integrity could falter so repeatedly in her analysis. ° First, her
argument that the reading order is "foreign" to our system of government is
simply false. As City of Parma' demonstrates, courts have required
defendants to go to considerable lengths to "enlighten" their employees
concerning the law and to publicize policies of nondiscrimination.'
There

147. Id. at 1401 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1401-02 (citations omitted).
150. Indeed, it was opinions such as Conair that prompted Senator Metzenbaum's complaint to
Ginsburg that "in reading your opinions, I can't discern whether you can identify with the harsh
practical realities of the workplace when antiunion employers intimidate their employees to prevent
them from organizing." Nomination ofRuth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 152

(1993). It should be noted, however, that on the Supreme Court Justice Ginsburg has indicated some
understanding of the needs of American workers. See, e.g., NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.
of Am., 114 S. Ct. 1778, 1785 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (challenging the majority's conclusion
that nurses were "supervisors" unprotected by the Act).
151. United States v. City of Parma, 661 F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 926
(1982), discussed supra at notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
152. Ginsburg also neglected the fact that employers are legally obligated to "enlighten" their

employees in a host of other circumstances. The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988), for example, places considerable burdens on employers to educate their
workers concerning health and safety dangers in the workplace. As Professor Rothstein remarks,
"[m]any OSHA standards require employers to provide specific safety training for employees." MARK
A. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 128 (3d ed. 1990). See, e.g., Ames Crane
& Rental Serv. v. Dunlop, 532 F.2d 123, 125 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding that "the duty of an employer
to take adequate precautionary steps to instruct and train employees against reasonably foreseeable
dangers" was not fulfilled by making available written safety materials); Brennan v. Butler Lime &
Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that employer's steps to protect workers
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is no principled reason why such a remedy should be commonly accepted in
cases of housing discrimination, but shunned in cases involving
discrimination based on union sympathies.
Furthermore, there is nothing "humiliating," "vindictive," or "punitive"
about a reading order. The employer is merely required to inform employees
of the Board's decision and to assure them that their rights will be respected.
Such a remedy can be characterized as degrading only if one believes that
employers are above the law.
Ginsburg's reliance on the traditional equitable reluctance to order
specific performance of personal service contracts is also misplaced. As
Judge Wald reasoned, "[tihat principle operates in a factual and legal context
too remote to serve as the basis for overturning the Board in an exercise of
remedial discretion."' 153 Indeed, it has been understood for decades that the
Board is empowered to order actions beyond those typically compelled by
courts of equity. As Justice Frankfurter reasoned, "[a]ttainment of a great
national policy through expert administration in collaboration with limited
judicial review must not be confined within narrow canons for equitable
54
relief deemed suitable by chancellors in ordinary private controversies.'
Given that the Board has unquestioned authority to order a recalcitrant
employer to hire or reinstate a worker she despises, 155 surely the Board has

must include "an adequate safety and training program"); Bechtel Power Co., 7 O.S.H.Cas. (BNA)
1361, 1365 (1979) (holding that employer's providing employees with safety booklet was insufficient
to comply with law); A.J. McNulty & Co., 4 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1097, 1100 (1976) ("The Commission
has consistently held that the mere issuance of safety instructions does not satisfy the employer's duty
....").As two scholars have explained, "the employer occupies a position of authority in the
workplace. The employee relies on the employer for training, direction and supervision in the
workplace. Thus, the employer is the most credible source of workplace safety information." Victor
E,Schwartz & Russell W. Driver, Warnings in the Workplace: The Needfor a Synthesis of Law and
Communication Theory, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 38, 81 (1983).
In light of the extensive steps employers must take to educate and protect workers against
physical hazards, there is no reason to question the Board's power to order employers to assure workers
that their statutory rights will be respected.
153. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1387 n.101 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
154. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 188 (1944) (upholding Board's power to order
hiring of workers denied employment due to union affiliation). Furthermore, as one thoughtful
observer has explained:
Whereas equity developed with knowledge that denial of equity jurisdiction would not
preclude legal relief, in unfair labor practice cases the NLRB is the final source of relief.
Moreover, equity courts prefer to order the cessation of unlawful conduct rather than
affirmative performance, especially when compliance must be measured against a
subjective standard. Yet, the NLRB constantly orders parties to undertake extensive
activity and requires both subjective and objective compliance with its orders. The
application of equitable standards to NLRB orders ignores Congress' decision to place the
administration of the NLRA in this agency in order to avoid the traditional restrictions on
equity courts.
Dennis M. Flannery, Note, The Need for Creative Orders Under Section 10(c) of the NationalLabor
Relations Act, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 69, 92-93 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
155. Phelps Dodge, 313 U.S. at 187-89; see also 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988) (authorizing Board to
order the "reinstatement of employees with or without back pay").

1994]

FAIR NOTICE

the lesser power of simply ordering that employer to address her employees
for several minutes.
Ginsburg's final argument-that an emotionally detached subordinate
may read the notice more effectively than the company's chief executive
officer- is misguided for several reasons. First, the Board's order in Conair
included the condition that "[t]he Board shall be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to provide for the attendance of a Board agent at any assembly
of employees called for the purpose of reading such notices."' 5 6 With a
Board representative present, it seems quite unlikely that an employer would
try to make the reading a farce.
Second, by definition, a subordinate cannot speak with the same
authority as a chief executive officer. Whereas a company's president seems
certain to capture her employees' attention, a subordinate may be received as
a poor flunky pressured into reading a notice the president refused to
recite. 7
Third, Ginsburg's insistence that the company's president be allowed to
delegate the reading to a subordinate also contradicts her proclaimed concern
for individual dignity. As Ginsburg (similarly to Mikva) failed to consider,
if the reading were humiliating, then "an owner-president who has acted
outrageously" should not be allowed to force an innocent subordinate to
perform the task. Unfortunately, Ginsburg seems to have internalized the
idea that top management is entitled to an aura of supremacy in the
workplace that the Board must respect even when the law has been broken.
Fourth, even if a subordinate might read the notice more effectively than
the company's president, that decision is best left in the hands of the Board.
It is the Board -- not a federal judge -- that is familiar with the relevant
parties and is in the best position to decide who should read the notice. For
an appellate judge to override the Board's judgment in this matter borders
upon judicial arrogance.
In sum, one can sympathize with Wald and Scalia when they state: "We
confess to being rather mystified as to the legal basis for the position taken
by Judge Ginsburg in her dissent."' 58 As they observed, "[w]hile the elevated
language of the dissent has a vaguely constitutional ring, it identifies no
constitutional provision or principle offended by the Board's action. '
The reason for this lack of constitutional analysis is that no such
argument could possibly prevail. The First Amendment is not violated
because the employer is not required to espouse allegiance to any ideology
or creed. The Fifth Amendment is not implicated because no selfincrimination occurs. Finally, the Eighth Amendment is inapposite because
"it was designed to protect those convicted of crimes,"6 rather than those
156. 261 N.L.R.B. 1189, 1289 (1982).
157. But see Klein, supra note 57, at 28.
158. Conair Corp. v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 1355, 1387 n.101 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
159. Id.
160. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (emphasis added) (holding that "the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of maintaining discipline in public
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subjected to civil remedies. All that remains, therefore, is rhetorical thunder
without doctrinal substance. That, of course, cannot legitimate judicial
interference with the Board's remedial scheme. As Wald and Scalia
reasoned, "[w]e believe that more than an affront to the sensibilities of
individual judges is required
to justify wholly eliminating this remedy from
'6
the Board's arsenal."' '
The District of Columbia Circuit addressed this issue again in United
Food.62 Here, the Board ordered a company's president to read the notice and
the Board's opinion was fully enforced by the District of Columbia Circuit.
16 3
Writing for the court, Judge Mikva distinguished his opinion in Teamsters
on the grounds that in the earlier case "the record did not indicate that
substantial links existed between the particular employer ordered to read the
notice and the labor law violations committed. ' "' Instead, the present case
was more analogous to Conair,for in each instance the company's president
had "pervasive personal involvement" in the unfair labor practices. 165 Judge
Mikva therefore decided that "the Board could well have concluded that only
a personal reading by him would 'dispel the atmosphere 6of
intimidation
6
created in large part by [his] own statements and actions." 1
Judge Mikva concluded in a philosophical vein, stating:
National labor law has undergone many changes from the early days of the
Wagner Act. Throughout this period, courts have acknowledged the broad
remedial discretion that the Board must have to effectuate the policies of the
statute. Such discretion makes it difficult to provide bright-line limits on the
remedies that the Board can utilize. As the decisions of this court in Teamsters
and Conair demonstrate, unique and specific facts of a case will more often than
not provide the measure that allows a remedy in one case and precludes it in
another. Such are the vagaries of judicial review of the delicate fabric of our
67
national labor law.'

Judge Mikva's conclusion is artful verse but poor law. Drawing
distinctions between Teamsters and Conairwill lead to uncertainty as parties
squabble over the precise extent of an executive's participation in the
violations. Rather than impose such "vagaries" on the system, the courts
should respect the Board's discretion in deciding who should read the notices.

schools"). Furthermore, the Board's reading orders cannot reasonably be considered "cruel and

unusual punishments."
161. 721 F.2d at 1387 n.101.
162. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union v. NLRB, 852 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
enforcing Monfort of Colo., Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1429 (1987).
163. Teamsters Local 115 v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 198 1), enforcing asmodified Haddon
House Food Prods., Inc., 242 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981), discussed
supra at notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
164. United Food, 852 F.2d at 1348.
165. Id. at 1348-49.
166. Id. at 1349 (quoting Conair Corp., 721 F.2d 1355, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
167. Id.
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The Board, in turn, should not hesitate to require that top executives help
redress the harms caused by their companies' unfair labor practices regardless
of whether they "personally" committed the violations.
The Board also issued an individualized reading order in S.E. Nichols,
Inc. 6' In this case, administrative law judge Josephine Kline carefully
explained why the company's president would be personally ordered to read
the notice. She reasoned:
Brecker [the company president] was a stellar performer in the [antiunion]
campaign. Despite that fact, he failed to testify, thus apparently attempting to
disassociate himself from the Company's conduct. It is essential that
unequivocal assurance be given the employees that Brecker, the director and
perpetrator of the wrongs, assumes responsibility for remedial action and it will
not be left to lower echelon management. In furtherance of this consideration,
I shall also recommend that all supervisors be required to attend any meetings
in their stores when the notice is read to employees. As Brecker's comrade in
arms, [the company's district supervisor] will also be required to attend the
meetings. 169

Judge Klein's decision is powerful, for she recognized the need to assure
employees that the company's president-as well as supervisory personnelwould respect their rights. By requiring all supervisors to attend the noticereadings and for the president himself to perform the recitations, Judge Klein
did her best to assure that the workers could recover from the employer's
extensive unfair labor practices. 7 '
Judge Klein's recommended remedy was adopted by the Board 7 . but
was modified by the Second Circuit. 72 The Second Circuit expressed
ambivalence over the reading order, acknowledging that it "insures that the
full counteracting force of the remedial order will be felt by the employees,"
but finding "an element of some humiliation in the requirement that a
company official personally and publicly read the notice.' 73 The court
therefore required the Board "to afford the company the alternative, at its
option, of having the notice read by a Board representative, rather than by

168. 284 N.L.R.B. 556 (1987), enforced as modified, 862 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1108 (1989).
169. Id. at 596.
170. Among other actions, the employer discharged employees because of their union sympathies,

threatened workers, and discriminated against employees who testified in Board proceedings. Id. at
556-62, 593. Moreover, the employer also violated the Act by suggesting to workers that they might
need the employer's "protection" if they were interviewed by the Board's agents. Id. at 580-82. For
a discussion of this aspect of the case, see John W. Teeter, Jr., Inadvisable Advice: Limits on
Employers' Counseling ofEmployees with Regard to Unfair Labor Practice Proceedings, 12 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 292, 302-04 (1990).
171. The Board did, however, limit the remedy's scope to the corporate division where the unfair
labor practices transpired. 284 N.L.R.B. at 560.
172. NLRB v. S.E. Nichols, Inc., 862 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989).
173. Id. at 962.
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president Brecker.'0 74 Once more, a tribunal chose to limit the potential
effectiveness of the remedy rather than subject a company official to some
conjectural embarrassment.
Notwithstanding this mixed reception by the appellate courts, the Board
recently has evinced its continued willingness to issue individualized reading
orders in particular cases. In Domsey Trading Corp., 5 the Board ordered
the company's manager (who was also one of the owner's sons) to read the
notice. The Board explained:
Based on the violence that Peter Salm [the manager] has perpetrated, directed,
and condoned here, his racial and sexual degradation of unfair labor practice
strikers and union representatives, and the other unfair labor practice violations
he personallycommitted... we believe that it would effectuate the policies of the
Act by requiring that Peter Salm read the notice in order to assuage the fears of
the unit employees that their future involvement in union and other protected
concerted activities will not result in similar misconduct on his part. This case
is clearly distinguishable from Monfort of Colorado, 298 NLRB 73 (1990),
where the Board did not require the employer's president to read the notice
because he was personally responsible for only two of the unfair labor practices
found. We do not impose this remedy for punitive reasons. It is designed, rather,
specifically to address Peter Salm's demonstrated willingness and proclivity to
resort to unlawful means, including violence, to thwart the union's organizing
campaign and otherwise to run roughshod over the fundamental statutory rights
of employees. Thus, because it will best effectuate the policies of the Act, we
adopt the judge's recommendation directing that Peter Salm read the notice in
76
English to the unit employees)

Domsey is commendable in that the Board ordered the manager
personally to read the notice without the option of delegating the task to a
subordinate or Board agent. Moreover, the Board was sensitive to the fact
that not all employees spoke77 English and arranged for the notice to be read
in other languages as well. 1
Unfortunately, however, the Board is still too timid in its approach and
too reluctant to make corporate officials take personal responsibility for

174. Id. The court also limited the remedy to the specific store where the violations occurred. Id.
175. 310 N.L.R.B. 777, 779-80 (1993), enforced, 16 F.3d 517 (2d Cir. 1994).
176. Id. at 780 (footnote omitted). The Board found that the manager had personally engaged in
a series of vicious acts that included unlawful discharges, threats, offers of bribes, and hitting a female
union representative with a rock. Id. at 779. According to testimony at the hearing, the manager also
subjected striking employees (most of whom were from Haiti and many of whom were women) to
sickening racial and sexual insults. Id. For provocative discussions of the harmful effects of such
verbal attacks, see

MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:

CRITICAL RACE THEORY,

(1993). The special problems confronted by
foreign-born workers are discussed in Lora Jo Foo, The Vulnerable and Exploitable Immigrant
Workforce and the Needfor Strengthening Worker Protective Legislation, 103 YALE L.J. 2179 (1994).
AsSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

177. 310 N.L.R.B. at 780 n.13.
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reading notices. It is instructive that the Domsey Board chose to distinguish
Monfort rather than abandon its case-by-case approach of deciding whether
a specified official must read the notice. We are thus left with uncertainty as
to when the Board will issue individualized reading orders and, for that
matter, when the courts will enforce them.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Board should issue a reading order in every case where the
employer is found to have violated the Act."'8 This reading should be
performed by a specific company official the Board has selected to maximize
the order's credibility and the employees' sense of assurance. Such orders are
necessary for a series of reasons. First, millions of Americans suffer from
reading deficiencies and cannot comprehend a printed notice. Second, even
literate employees may not happen to observe the printed notice at the
workplace. Third, a mere piece of paper is unlikely to reassure victims of
unfair labor practices that the employer will take rehabilitative action and
respect their rights. Fourth, it has been demonstrated repeatedly that an
employer's oral statements to her employees are usually more effective than
written communications. Fifth, for the employer to stand before her workers
and actually read the notice carries more symbolic weight than any posted
notice could possess.
Furthermore, it might not be too wishful to hope that employers required
to read notices might internalize some portion of what they speak. Instead
of simply having the notice posted, employers would have to assure their
employees, in a face-to-face setting, that they would comply with the Board's
order and respect their rights. Even employers who performed the reading
solely as a legal requirement might come to appreciate the intrinsic value of
practicing what they preached. As Professor Murphy reasons, "[t]he habitual
use of certain means to attain an end often induces us to treat those means as
an end."17 9 One would hope that reading orders would induce at least a few
employers to view compliance with the Act as a worthy end in itself.
Employers might also find themselves the beneficiaries of unexpected
rewards. Workers might well appreciate the employer's openness, grow
confident of their rights, and become more committed to their jobs. 8 0 As
industrial psychologists have discovered, there is a causal connection
between "worker morale" and "productive efficiency."''

178. I also would approve of ordering union officials to read the Board's notices when they have
violated the Act, but that justification would require a separate article to explain.
179. MURPHY, supra note 38, at 38.
180. See, e.g., Burke & Wilcox, supra note 127 (analyzing relationship between employer openness
and employee job satisfaction); Barenberg, supra note 9, at 893 (warning that "United States workers
of the 1990s are much more likely to resent authoritarian or overtly inegalitarian management styles
than their forerunners of the interwar years").
181. MURPHY, supra note 38, at 29.
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For these benefits to unfold, the Board must show determination, and the
courts must show restraint. The Board should resolutely issue reading orders
and refuse to acquiesce in the interference ofjudges. The Board should also
make each reading order an individualized one instead of reserving this
remedy for rare cases.
The courts, in turn, must exercise self-discipline and cooperate with the
Board's remedial efforts.8 2 The Board's reading orders are fair, necessary,
and squarely within the administrative discretion conferred by § 10(c). There
is, thus, no principled basis for judicial interference.
By itself, my proposal cannot transform American workplaces into
temples of harmony and production." 3 Far more must be done to free
workers from the coercion of lawless employers. At a minimum, however,
we should begin our endeavor by giving workers fair and meaningful notice
that their rights under the Act will be vindicated.

182. See, e.g., Flannery, supra note 154 at 90 (explaining that "[u]nless the NLRB secures the
cooperation of the reviewing courts, its efforts to adapt orders to varying factual situations will fail")
(footnotes omitted); Michael H. Stephens, Comment, Recent Developments in the Creationof Effective
Remedies Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 17 BUFF. L. REv. 830, 831 (1968) (asserting that
"[t]he Board's efforts to create orders which effectively remedy particular situations will necessarily
be in vain without the cooperation of the reviewing courts") (footnote omitted). As Professor Lesnick
relates, however, "[Oar from receiving encouragement (much less a prod) in coping with the serious
inadequacies of the remedial scheme routinely employed, the courts have in effect told the Board that
they must face a vigilant and skeptical, even hostile, reception when they attempt to take some
minimal steps towards achieving a better climate of compliance." Lesnick, supra note 72, at 49.
183. The admittedly incremental nature of my proposal at least renders it more feasible than
reforms dependent upon legislative action. See, e.g., Houseman, supra note 33, at 724 (concluding
that "labor law reform in general appears to be a distant hope at the moment"); Weiler, Promises to
Keep, supra note 115, at 1770 & n.l (describing the failure of the Labor Reform Act to win Senate
approval during the Carter presidency). The prospect for legislative reform under the Clinton
administration seems equally bleak. A bill that would forbid employers from permanently replacing
economic strikers, for example, is "headed for almost certain defeat in the Senate." 146 Lab. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) 273 (June 27, 1994).
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FAIR NOTICE
APPENDIX

NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide by
this notice.
Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or
protection
To choose not to engage in any of these
protected concerted activities.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, coerce, or otherwise

discriminate against you by discharging you for engaging in union
activities or other protected concerted activity.
WE WILL NOT interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the

exercise of your rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act by
removing union newsletters from union bulletin boards at the
facilities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,

restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer Jay L. Boyland immediate and full
reinstatement to his former job or, if that job no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his seniority or
any other rights and privileges he previously enjoyed, and WE WILL
make him whole for the losses he incurred as a result of the
discrimination against him and expunge from our files any reference
to his discharge and notify him the unlawful discharge will not be
used as a basis for future personnel actions against him.
WE WILL, if requested by the Union, allow the reposting of
the union newsletters previously removed.
MONONGAHELA POWER COMPANY

